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ABSTRACT
 The 2002 ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the government of Canada represents an 
interesting case study in Canadian federalism. This thesis seeks to explore the perspective of the 
government of Saskatchewan during the debate surrounding the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
In examining Saskatchewan’s perspective, this thesis uses the theoretical framework developed by 
Richard Simeon in Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. In 
particular, the four major sources of intergovernmental conflict identified by Simeon, economic 
conflict, ideological conflict, political competition, and differences in perspective, will be used to 
examine Saskatchewan’s reaction to the ratification to the Kyoto Protocol.
 Climate change policy provides interesting insights into Canadian federalism. 
Constitutional authority in environmental policy is concurrently shared between both levels of 
government. At the same time, the federal government has authority to make international treaties, 
but requires provincial consent to implement those treaties in areas of provincial jurisdiction. 
Unlike other previous intergovernmental negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol’s ratification also 
introduces international elements and considerations to domestic federal-provincial relations, 
which have rarely been explored in academic literature surrounding Canadian federalism. As such, 
this thesis hopes to use the case study of Saskatchewan’s perspective on Kyoto’s ratification as a 
means of expanding on the relevance of Simeon’s framework through the consideration of 
unexplored international factors on Canadian federalism.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
 One of the most important policy problems facing Canada is how to deal with climate 
change in a manner that is environmentally effective but does not undermine economic growth. 
However, successful climate change policy is complicated by the constitutional division of powers 
between the federal and provincial governments, which has led the Supreme Court to rule that 
environmental policy is a concurrent power with shared jurisdiction between both levels of 
government (Friends of the Oldman River v. Canada [Minister of Transportation], 1992). 
Additionally, climate change is a cross-jurisdictional policy problem because greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), once emitted into the atmosphere, cannot be localized to their emission source. The 
consequence is that the poor behavior of one province in regulating the emission of greenhouse 
gases contributes to climate change in all province. Similarly, this domestic dynamic of climate 
change also applies internationally: the poor behavior of one country in regulating the emission of 
greenhouse gases contributes to climate change in all countries. 
 As a result, any realistically successful plan to address climate change and the emission of 
greenhouse gases requires the cooperation and coordination of all provinces domestically, and of 
all countries internationally. Unsurprisingly, cooperation among governments is easier to imagine 
than it is to achieve. Internationally, the Kyoto Protocol1 attempts to provide a framework to 
address climate change and to achieve cooperation among the industrialized countries of the world 
in regulating GHG emissions. At the September 2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced the 
government of Canada’s intention to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, by stating: “before the end of the 
year, the Canadian Parliament will be asked to vote on the ratification of the Kyoto 
1
1 The “Kyoto Protocol” and the “Kyoto Accord” are interchangeable terms.
Accord” (Chrétien, 2002). Mounting international pressure and the growing awareness of Canadian 
citizens of climate change had helped to motivate Ottawa’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 
and Chrétien made full use of this international setting to emphasis his government’s commitment 
to the Kyoto Protocol.
 Many of Canada’s provincial governments were caught off-guard by Chrétien’s 
announcement. Only Quebec and Manitoba supported the federal government’s stance on the 
Kyoto Protocol, but even they were wary of the unilateralism displayed by the Chrétien 
government’s announcement in Johannesburg (Harrison, 2003: 338). Although the federal 
government had authority to sign and ratify international treaties, the Labour Convention Case of 
1937 had established that the implementation of international treaties could not override provincial 
jurisdiction (Morton, 1996: 45). While not challenging the federal government’s authority to make 
international treaties, the provinces felt that constitutional convention and the jurisprudence set by 
the Labour Conventions Case required more extensive federal-provincial consultation before 
Ottawa’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Provincial willingness to cooperate with the federal 
government’s decision to ratify was further weakened by the uncertainty surrounding the failure of 
Ottawa to release a comprehensive climate change plan. As a result, the three month period 
between Chrétien’s announcement at the UN Summit and the House of Commons’ vote to ratify on 
December 12, 2002, saw a testing of Canadian federalism.
 The Saskatchewan government was one of the provincial governments with deep-seated 
concerns about the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol without a clearly defined implementation 
plan. This opposition by Saskatchewan went against the political ideology of its governing party, 
the New Democratic party, led at the time by Premier Lorne Calvert. Veteran Saskatchewan 
political commentator Murray Mandryk remarked on the uncharacteristic response of the NDP 
government in opposing Kyoto in his February 20, 2002, article in the Regina Leader Post: 
“[Premier] Calvert's Kyoto decision is right for the province.” Mandryk argues that the politically 
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easy decision for the NDP government would have been to support the federal Liberals’ move to 
ratify: “there certainly is enough credible science for a social democratic premier to side with the 
environmentalist over the industrialists” (2002a). Within provincial politics, Mandryk also notes 
that: “losing the environmental left [poses] a big political problem for Calvert, who has been rather 
successful in the past year at bringing the left back into the NDP's tent” (2002a).
 While at a cursory glance Saskatchewan’s opposition to Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol may seem puzzling, analyzing Saskatchewan’s perspective through the theoretical 
framework of federal-provincial relations developed by Canadian political scientist Richard 
Simeon can help solve the puzzle. Simeon’s framework suggests that the four most prevalent 
sources of conflict in Canadian intergovernmental relations are economic conflict, ideological 
conflict, political competition among governments, and differences in perspective (2006: 163). 
Therefore, using Saskatchewan’s perspective on Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as a 
case study, it is possible to tease out the root causes of Saskatchewan’s opposition, while at the 
same time building on the usefulness of Simeon’s framework as an analytical tool for 
understanding federal-provincial relations.
1.2 Focus, Objectives and Research Questions 
 The objective of this thesis is to put rhetoric and opinions aside and use Simeon’s framework 
to determine what were the major sources of conflict between the government of Saskatchewan 
and the federal government during Canada’s 2002 ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Additionally, 
this thesis will expand on Simeon’s framework by exploring several important international 
influences on both levels of government during Canada’s ratification debate. To narrow the scope 
and focus of this thesis, only the perspectives of the government of Saskatchewan and the federal 
government will be examined. Several research questions are important for exploring this topic: 
3
 1. Using Simeon’s theoretical framework, what are the root sources of Saskatchewan’s 
opposition to the Kyoto Protocol?
 2. How did the international factors of climate change and the Kyoto Protocol affect federal-
provincial negotiations?
 3. How effective is Simeon’s framework at encompassing these international factors in 
describing federal-provincial relations?
 This thesis argues that Simeon’s framework remains a useful analytical nearly 40 years after 
its original publication. This thesis also argues that there were multiple facets to Saskatchewan’s 
opposition to the ratification of Kyoto. As well, there were a number of international considerations 
that are useful in explaining the positions taken by both Saskatchewan and the federal government.
1.3 Importance of Thesis
 How Canada ought best to deal with climate change and global warming remains a 
contentious issue in Canadian politics. The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the Chrétien 
government in late 2002 was an attempt by the federal government to set aspirational goals and 
priorities on climate change through the mechanism of an international treaty. However, the 
provincial governments were not consulted to the extent they felt they deserved. These aspects of 
environmental policy, international treaties, and Canadian federalism deserve academic attention.
 This thesis hopes to provide a contribution to the study of Canadian federalism and 
intergovernmental relations by examining the ongoing usefulness of Simeon’s theoretical 
framework. Moreover, since the publication of Simeon’s framework in Federal-Provincial 
Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada in 19722, there have been a number of 
developments in Canadian intergovernmental relations. Notably the issues of environmental 
protection and climate change policy have been identified as significant policy problems. Similarly, 
4
2 Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada was republished in 2006
international influences on domestic intergovernmental relations have come to play an important 
role in the shape and nature of conflict in Canadian federalism. Analyzing and building upon 
Simeon’s theoretical frameworks is beneficial for political scientists hoping to understand 
Canadian intergovernmental relations.
 This thesis also seeks to address the relative dearth of in-depth studies on Canadian 
intergovernmental relations, climate change policy, and the influence of international factors. In 
particular, there have been even fewer studies with a focus on Saskatchewan’s role in climate 
change policy. A case study of Saskatchewan’s unique perspective during Ottawa’s ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol may help to smooth future climate change negotiations by pinpointing the most 
contentious sources of conflict from the viewpoint of the government of Saskatchewan. 
1.4 Structure of Thesis
 The perspective of the Saskatchewan government on the 2002 ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol by Ottawa is presented in the subsequent chapters.
 Chapter 2, Federalism: Theoretical Perspectives, provides a brief literature review of the 
theories of the structure Canadian federalism and intergovernmental relations. Additionally, 
Simeon’s framework is explained in detail.
 Chapter 3, Understanding Context: Environmental Policy, Climate Change and Canada, 
provides the background information on the history of environmental policy in Canada, the 
constitutional division of powers in respect to environmental policy, and the science behind climate 
change.
 Chapter 4, The Kyoto Protocol: Saskatchewan’s Perspective, examines the history of the 
Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent climate change debate in Canada leading up to the ratification 
debate of 2002.
5
 Chapter 5, Sources of Conflict: Saskatchewan’s Perspective, applies Simeon’s framework of 
four major sources of conflict to Saskatchewan and attempts to determine what motivated 
Saskatchewan’s opposition to Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
 Chapter 6, Conclusion, summarizes and integrates the analysis to include future implications 
for Canadian climate change policy. 
1.5 Methodology 
 This thesis makes use of a number of sources to provide supporting evidence. Both primary 
and secondary sources were consulted. Primary sources consulted include government documents, 
polling results, position papers, court cases, legislative debates, newspaper articles and speeches. 
Secondary sources include journal articles and academic monographs. As discussed earlier, this 
thesis uses the theoretical framework developed by Richard Simeon in Federal-Provincial 
Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada as a basis for analyzing Saskatchewan’s 
perspective. Additionally, three interviews were conducted in the fall of 2009 to provide insight 
and context into Saskatchewan’s position.
 A number of primary and secondary sources were accessed through the Internet because 
using electronic sources and databases were the only practical means of accessing some data.
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CHAPTER 2:
 FEDERALISM: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
2.1 Introduction
 Canadian federalism and intergovernmental relations involves a complicated web of ideas, 
beliefs, practices, and conventions that are increasingly affected by international pressures and the 
desire of provincial governments to act independently of the federal government. To effectively 
provide a theoretical context for this thesis, it is important to frame several important terms relating 
to federalism, provide a brief literature review of academic thought on Canadian federalism, and to 
analyze Simeon’s theoretical framework on intergovernmental relations. Combined this theoretical 
background information will serve as a guide for developing a case study of Canadian federalism 
and intergovernmental relations by exploring Saskatchewan’s perspective on the 2002 ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol by the federal government.
 This chapter will first examine the definition of federalism. Next, the chapter will explain 
the cooperative versus confrontational federalism continuum. Finally, the chapter will introduce 
Simeon’s theoretical framework.
2.2 Definition of Federalism
 K.C. Wheare’s defines federalism as “the method of dividing powers so that the general 
and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent” (Wheare, 1964: 
10) In Canada, the federal government in Ottawa acts as the unifying national government and the 
ten provinces are the geographically defined regional government in Wheare’s definition. 
Provincial powers are enshrined constitutionally and the provinces are polities separate from the 
federal government. Neither the federal nor the provincial governments have hierarchical control 
over the other, and each order of government maintains autonomy (Simeon, 2006: 2). Federalism 
acts to provide a form of regional government where decisions can be made on a range of local 
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issues without the consent of the national majority. Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad contend 
that a well performing federal system “must respect federal principles, sustain the balance between 
unity and diversity, provide a setting for discussion and negotiation between governments, and 
facilitate agreement, or at least understanding, on major issues in a manner that respects the 
positions of both levels of government” (2008: 6). 
 Constitutionally protected areas of provincial jurisdiction cannot be infringed upon by the 
federal government except under unusual circumstances. Unilateral action by either level of 
government in areas of joint jurisdiction or interference by one level government in the 
constitutional jurisdiction of the other can lead to conflict and damaged relations. Nonetheless, in 
Canada, the federal government has a greater ability to generate revenue and over time has become 
active in provincial jurisdictions through the federal spending power (Baier, 2008: 23). Non-
constitutional alterations to the division of powers have also been reached through administrative 
agreements (Rocher and Smith, 2003a: 8). Often, intergovernmental relations, in the form of 
executive federalism, negotiations between high level decision makers such as first ministers, have 
resulted in formal and informal agreements that have been used in lieu of court rulings or 
constitutional amendments to alter the nature of Canadian federalism, and this has led to an 
enhanced role for the federal government in areas of provincial competence while the provinces’ 
legal control of their jurisdictional responsibilities has been maintained.
 The legal text of the constitution only partially explains the many conventions and practices 
that influence the structure of government and the political relationships among individuals, civil 
society, the private sector, and government. Indeed, in Canada citizens tend to identify with their 
regional government before their national government in domestic matters. In 2007, 46.7 per cent 
of Canadians felt their provincial/territorial government was not treated with the respect it deserved 
by the federal government (Kincaid and Cole, 2008: 479). At the same time, the federal 
government in Ottawa often wishes to establish a national identity based upon a harmonization of 
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standards and practices in several key policy sectors, notably healthcare, aspects of the economy, 
and the environment across the breadth of the country (Rocher and Smith, 2003a: 8). Naturally, a 
large degree of conflict arises over how politicians view the federal system. One analytical tool 
used to describe the range of views on federalism is the cooperative versus confrontational 
federalism continuum.
2.3 Cooperative versus Confrontational Federalism Continuum
 The cooperative versus confrontational continuum is a useful conceptual device for 
understanding intergovernmental relations in Canada. This continuum can aid academics in 
assessing the nature of intergovernmental relations among Canadian governments regarding 
important public policies. But, despite these different conceptions of how governments ought to 
cooperate with each other, Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad note that the polarization of the 
positions of either level of government can be mitigated when each level of government recognizes 
a role for the other in their areas of jurisdiction (2008: 4).
 Bakvis and Skogstad identify this continuum as containing five distinct models of decision-
making between levels of government. At one end is the independent governments model, which 
views the jurisdictional competences of each order of government as being in watertight 
compartments, where actions within a government’s legal jurisdiction are conducted unilaterally 
and without consultation of the other level of government. Next is a consultation model where 
governments solicit the advice of the other level of government, but in the end are not bound by 
that advice. A middle ground is the co-ordination model, which describes a situation in which the 
two orders of government seek to develop a mutual strategy with common, but informal, policy 
goals. With these common goals in mind, each level of government then implements the strategy 
with its own initiatives and within its own constitutional jurisdiction. The fourth model is 
collaboration, where both levels of government seek to create a setting of equal participation 
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among the provinces and the federal government where best practices can be shared and joint-
programs developed in the pursuit of consistent and broad national policy. The final model is joint 
decision-making. This final model requires complete agreement among governments on every 
aspect of policy-making before either level can proceed with implementing new initiatives; the 
situation described by this last model has often been criticized as leading to a state of paralysis in 
which decisions are weakened to the point where they become ineffectual (Bakvis and Skogstad, 
2008: 7-8; 14-15).
 A critical analysis of this continuum reveals that neither extreme is practical or has 
historically characterized decision making; therefore, the vast majority of intergovernmental 
decision-making will be either consultative, collaborative or involve coordination. To elaborate, at 
the independent governments extreme, the classical federalist idea of a strict division of powers 
fails to acknowledge several aspects of the Canadian constitution, such as the federal power to 
appoint lieutenant-governors and areas of concurrent jurisdiction such as agriculture or 
immigration, that have always prevented a truly watertight division of jurisdiction (Bakvis and 
Skogstad, 2008: 7; Watts, 2003: 143). Indeed, on a practical level, governing Canada’s 
interdependent and continental economy in a system in which there are divided responsibilities 
between orders of government over social and economic policy makes cooperation between the 
provinces and the federal government necessary for policy to meet with any degree of success 
(Watts, 2003: 122). Depending upon the nature of the policy, provincial governments, collectively 
and individually, on the one hand, and Ottawa, on the other, have often found common ground 
through intergovernmental structures such as first ministers conferences, cost-sharing programs, 
and day-to-day interaction among civil servants or politicians (Watts, 2003: 127).
 While the cooperation versus confrontational federalism continuum is a useful analytical 
device, it is also important to recognize some of the weaknesses in using the continuum to examine 
the nuts and bolts of federal-provincial relations. Kathryn Harrison identifies a number of pitfalls 
10
associated with relying on too narrow a view of intergovernmental relations (Harrison, 2000: 
12-16). Harrison argues that the normative aspects of the conflict-cooperation dichotomy are also 
worthy of careful consideration. Specifically, it is easy to view all acts of cooperation as 
progressive and good in and of themselves. However, at times a more unilateral and 
confrontational approach may be necessary to advance the policy agenda and achieve policy goals 
and not simply cooperation itself (Harrison, 2000: 12). For example, conflict between governments 
can lead to creative policy solutions such, as Simeon points out, occurred in 1964 with the Canada 
Pension Plan, when provincial opposition forced Ottawa to amend its plans and improve its 
proposed CPP (2006: 257). 
 The conceptual framework of the cooperative versus confrontational continuum is a useful 
tool for categorizing trends in intergovernmental affairs relative to previous experience. Similarly, 
drastic shifts from one model of decision-making to another along the continuum are often partially 
responsible for intergovernmental conflict.
2.4 Simeon’s Four Sources of Conflict
 While the cooperative versus confrontational continuum identified by Bakvis and Skogstad 
helps to categorize and describe major trends in intergovernmental relations, it is also necessary to 
identify the major sources of intergovernmental conflict that influence how governments will react 
to shifts along the cooperative versus confrontational continuum in specific policy areas, in our 
case environmental policy. 
 Richard Simeon’s 1972 Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in 
Canada identifies four main sources of conflict in intergovernmental relations that are useful in 
examining specific policy areas: economic interests, ideology, political competition, and 
differences of perspective. However, before outlining Simeon’s sources of conflict it is important 
to note that while partisan competition between provincial governments of one political party and 
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the federal government of another political party can be a source of conflict, Simeon discounts this 
factor as a major source of intergovernmental conflict in Canadian federalism. Simeon explains 
that provincial governments of the same party as the federal government will often be vocal 
opponents, and likewise provincial governments of opposing parties to the federal government can 
be the most ardent supporters of federal initiatives (2006: 194). Instead, Simeon contends that the 
other four factors play a greater explanatory role in understanding conflict and cooperation in 
Canadian federalism.
 That being said, one of the important preconditions for successful intergovernmental 
relations is that both levels of government show mutual respect and acknowledge a valid place and 
role for the other level government in policy making (Simeon, 2006: 197). Conflict and 
cooperation between the federal government and each individual provincial government varies 
from issue to issue based upon the priority placed on each individual policy sector and the 
resources each government is willing to expend on an issue. Conflict is also reduced by the 
personal relationships that develop through negotiation among politicians and through day-to-day 
interactions among civil servants.
2.4.1 Economic Interests
 Simeon contends that one of the primary sources of conflict in Canadian intergovernmental 
relations is concern over economic interests. Indeed, Simeon views conflicts over economic 
interests as “the most obvious source of conflict among the governments” of Canada (2006: 163).
 For some provincial governments the need to stabilize their economies and revenues 
demands a strong federal government capable of providing assistance. Provincial governments 
such as those of PEI, New Brunswick or Newfoundland and Labrador, for example, have 
traditionally had a proportionally higher percentage of revenue deriving from federal transfers than 
the wealthier provinces with more vibrant economies, such as Ontario or Alberta. Economic 
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dependency on Ottawa can condition poorer provinces to avoid conflict compared to more 
independent richer provinces (Simeon, 2006: 164). Poorer provinces advocate federal primacy in 
fiscal matters as a means of redistributing wealth in Canada, which allows fiscally weaker 
governments to provide roughly equal levels of basic services to their citizens as those in fiscally 
stronger provinces. Indeed, Simeon states: “for the poorer provinces, paradoxical as it may seem, a 
strong central government is a condition of strong provincial governments” (2006: 165). 
 Wealthier provinces advocate a shift of tax room from the federal government to the 
provinces. These provinces serve to benefit from Ottawa vacating tax room and lowering 
equalization payments to poorer provinces. At times affluent provinces also argue that transferring 
revenue from their province to more disadvantaged provinces serves to support poor fiscal habits 
and that federal aid distorts the normal economic equilibrium of Canada (Simeon, 2006: 166). 
These richer provinces often argue that Ottawa must not weaken the richer provinces because they 
generate the most wealth and ensure fiscal stability within the country as a whole.
 Federal-provincial conflict also emerges from the very nature of provincial economies 
themselves. For example, the Western provinces have resource oriented economies and resent 
attempts to regulate the economy nationally through trade, tariff, and freight policies (Simeon, 
2006: 167). Often these provincial governments are competing with each other for a competitive 
business environment, which can easily cause conflict with Ottawa when the federal government 
takes a stance favoring one province over the other, such as with the awarding of federal contracts. 
 When provincial governments negotiate with Ottawa, economic interests usually take 
centre stage. Wrangling over policy is often reduced to wrangling over funding.
2.4.2 Ideology 
 Political ideology is another important source of conflict in intergovernmental relations. 
Simeon identifies ideology as “a basic set of prescriptions about the nature and purpose of the 
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system” (2006: 168). The views that political leaders have “about the nature of the political system, 
the proper balance of the governments within it, and the ways the decision process should operate” 
affect the outcome of negotiations (Simeon, 2006: 168).  These ideological factors are responsible 
for the strategies that politicians will adopt to meet their political goals. Due to the close 
relationship between ideology and the personal values of decision makers, ideological conflict is 
often more difficult to overcome than other forms of conflict. Each party in a conflict is often 
entrenched in its world view and accommodation of others’ interests can prove difficult (Simeon, 
2006: 169).
 In the context of the Canadian political landscape, Simeon views conflicts over the nature 
of the political system as more prevalent than conflict over specific policy issues because the 
Canadian welfare state is widely accepted (2006: 169). For example, most politicians can agree on 
broad policy goals, but some may favor a private approach over a public approach to their 
achievement, or federal over provincial. Simeon characterizes this type of conflict as “yes, 
but” (2006: 170). In this sense decision makers say “yes” to the policy but take issue with the way 
the policy is implemented.
  Provinces that share a concern over national unity with Ottawa will at times put aside 
differences with the federal government and with other provinces to reach a common goal. Simeon 
provides the historical example of Ontario’s support of equalization, despite the potential damaging 
effects equalization may have had on Ontario’s fiscal strength, because national unity is seen as 
ideologically more important than short term economic gain (2006: 166).
 The federal government has an ideological preference for cooperative federalism that often 
serves to limit conflict. The federal government has had a general view that interaction with the 
provinces requires close consultation and mutual respect for jurisdictional boundaries (Simeon, 
2006: 172). However, the force of this ideological perspective is difficult to discern for academics 
and other observers when trying to determine the motivations behind federal decisions. Federal 
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adherence to the belief in cooperative federalism can vary greatly depending on how important the 
issue of the day is compared with the general desire for cooperation with the provinces (SImeon, 
2006: 173).
 While Ottawa’s ideological preference for cooperative federalism in some instances has 
served to lessen conflict with the provincial governments, the federal government seeks to maintain 
its power and status (Simeon, 2006: 173). Federal officials are conscious of the power provinces 
may gain from increased province-building capacities and will at times seek to maximize federal 
powers by cautiously guarding the role of the federal government in setting national policy, 
especially in economic matters (Simeon, 2006: 174). This is based on the federal government’s 
view of itself as the only level of government that has a truly national viewpoint. In this sense, 
while Ottawa has ideological preferences for lessening intergovernmental conflict, its desire to act 
as the definitive national voice may in fact increase conflict because individual provinces may feel 
ignored when Ottawa acts unilaterally to assert its national voice.
 While ideological perspectives are important for most provinces in intergovernmental 
relations, only in Quebec do they carry the same weight and priority in decision-making as they do 
for the federal government. For example, Quebec places a large degree of importance on ideology 
when formulating its response to intergovernmental issues (Simeon, 2006: 174). Quebec’s 
nationalist ideology acts to inform many of its positions on federal-provincial issues. Ideologically, 
Quebec also views its position in Canada as distinct from its English-Canadian counterparts. 
Quebec’s belief in its role as protector of a distinct national culture means that its point of view 
places the needs of the Quebecois people first and above that of the Canadian people (Simeon, 
2006: 175). This can easily lead to conflicting views on Canadian national policy. As well, other 
provinces are suspicious of the federal government when it is seen to capitulate to Quebec’s desire 
for a special place in Canadian federalism. A corollary is that Quebec’s activist provincial 
government seeks a role for itself in all potential areas of its jurisdiction and beyond, and this can 
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incite other provincial governments to act similarly (Simeon, 2006: 176). Quebec views its role as 
the representative of the Quebecois people as paramount in its relations with the federal 
government, and this increases the influence of regionalism in Canadian federalism. For these 
reasons Quebec carefully guards the areas of provincial competence from encroachment by the 
federal government and will also seek to limit federal programs within the provinces in any area of 
provincial jurisdiction (Simeon, 2006: 177-178). Nonetheless, while Quebec couches much of its 
strategy in ideological terms, it remains pragmatic in assuring its citizens receive an equitable share 
in the federal system, especially in economic matters, and will, consequently, subsume ideology 
when practicality demands such a course of action (Simeon, 2006: 178).
 While Quebec frames its approach in more ideological terms, the other provincial 
governments frame their desire for greater provincial control over policy in more pragmatic terms. 
Many provincial governments simply believe that they are better positioned to devise and 
implement policy. While broad economic and fiscal policy may require a strong central 
government to shield Canada’s economy from fluctuations in a globalized international system, 
most social and domestic policy is best decided and implemented by provincial governments 
(Simeon, 2006: 181-182). These provincial politicians often have the ideological perspective that 
decentralization is preferable to centralization. 
 In summation, at times ideology can act to smooth federal-provincial relations and at other 
times it can serve as an important and major source of intergovernmental conflict.
2.4.3 Political Competition
 In all policy formulation and negotiation, political competition remains a potent source of 
conflict. Both provincial governments and the federal government seek the support of the 
electorate when formulating policy. As a result, decisions are sometimes made purely out of a 
desire to make government institutions and political parties look more favorable to a particular 
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constituency. Simeon characterizes these political goals as “status” goals, which are based on 
electoral, psychological, and policy reasons for supporting a particular policy stance (2006: 
184-185).
 While the two levels of government in Canada do not directly compete for the support of 
voters in elections, they do compete for credit or to avoid blame with the electorate (Simeon, 2006: 
185). Concern over credit and blame is most evident in the distribution of resources and the 
amount of credit either the provincial or the federal governments receive for programs. Politically, 
governments wish to accumulate goodwill from the programs they fund, and conflict can arise 
when one level of government believes the other parties are seeking to attribute unjustified credit 
to themselves. At the same time, governments wish to avoid blame when they are not responsible 
for the decisions leading to, or the implementation of, controversial policies because they were not 
consulted. At a basic level, the two levels of government compete to shift blame and gain credit at 
any opportunity so as to gain the approval of their citizens (Simeon, 2006: 186). As a result, 
political leaders will sometimes limit their activity to those issues in which they can gain 
significant credit or avoid significant blame (Simeon, 2006: 187). 
 Simeon also identifies psychological status goals, which, although difficult to observe and 
document, involve an individual’s desire to maintain political power and prestige. Enhancing the 
welfare of the electorate is secondary to achieving psychological status goals; instead individual 
decision makers are primarily concerned with seeking to maintain and enhance their personal 
status. Likewise, another important factor in realizing psychological status goals is the desire for 
bureaucracies to maintain their status and to avoid losing resources to departments implementing 
new programs or shifts in responsibility of delivery from one level of government to the other 
(Simeon, 2006: 188). Consequently, the policy positions that the bureaucracy may advocate may 
on occasion be affected by the desire to retain bureaucratic power and prestige. 
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 Finally, political competition may develop over the policy development process. Political 
actors naturally seek to receive recognition for their contribution and ideas. A lack of recognition of 
the contributions of a member or members can lead to conflict and disagreement (Simeon, 2006: 
189). In federal-provincial relations, each level of government seeks to see its ideas incorporated 
and to gain credit through this process. 
 
2.4.4 Different Perspectives
 Conflict among governments can arise simply from differences in priorities. Each of 
Canada’s 14 governments have a different set of priorities that are at the top of their agenda. When 
a specific government’s priorities are not being met in negotiations that government can become 
hostile to the process (Simeon, 2006: 189). As well, at times the concerns of one government over 
the environment, for example, may not carry the same priority with another government to the 
same degree as, perhaps, concerns over economic development. In the end, as mentioned above, all 
politicians are responsible to a particular and different electorate with differing priorities, and their 
positions on intergovernmental issues will naturally reflect this reality. 
 Differences in perspectives are closely related to the regionalism that informs a great deal 
of Canadian politics. The federal government seeks to develop national policies and a national 
visions. The provincial governments, while cognizant of this need, judge policy based upon local 
needs and politics (Simeon, 2006: 190). For provincial governments, the national perspective is 
viewed as catering to a “mythical Canadian” who does not exist in any specific geographical 
jurisdiction, and catering to this ideal of the “mythical Canadian” by the federal government can 
easily result in waste and confusion (Simeon, 2006: 190).
 Provincial skepticism over Ottawa’s motivations for changes in national programs or for 
the creation new national programs by the federal government also leads to conflict. The national 
goals of the federal government to regulate areas of national concern, such as the economy or the 
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environment, are viewed suspiciously by provincial governments because some of the powers 
constitutionally necessary to enact these policies rest with the provinces. In short, provinces will 
sometimes see the federal government’s motivation for action as seeking to maximize and expand 
its jurisdictional powers rather than as altruistic goals, such as seeking to combat national 
unemployment or pollution (Simeon, 2006: 190). Suspicion over motives is often compounded by 
conflict over status goals and political competition. 
 Provincial governments can also be suspicious of federal initiatives based on what they 
believe to be favoritism. For example, Western provinces often feel that new economic policies 
will disproportionately benefit the Atlantic provinces and Quebec (Simeon, 2006: 193).
 As can be seen, the individual environments facing different governments can easily lead to 
differences in perspective that will result in intergovernmental conflict.
2.5 International Influences and Simeon’s Framework
 This thesis also seeks to analyze the international influences that are increasingly playing a 
role in Canadian intergovernmental decision making and how they might fit into Simeon’s 
theoretical framework. It will argue that international influences played an important and 
supporting role in determining both the government of Canada’s decision to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol and the government of Saskatchewan’s decision to oppose ratification. Analyzing federal-
provincial relations in policy fields affected by international actors and considerations expands on 
Simeon’s theoretical framework by introducing a possible new source of conflict. 
  The case study of Kyoto suggest that these international influences played a strong role in 
Canada’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and in provincial objections. On the economic front, 
for example, Saskatchewan’s concern over its international competitiveness with other jurisdictions 
was one of the most potent objections to the federal government’s decision to ratify. Looking at 
ideology, the federal government’s ideological preference towards cooperative federalism was 
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overshadowed by its ideological commitment to multilateralism and internationalism. Similarly, 
the Prime Minister was interested in competing politically with the U.S. for recognition on the 
international stage - a desire that translated into an aggressive unilateral agenda domestically on the 
climate change front. Finally, when it comes to Simeon’s fourth source of conflict, differing 
perspectives, Saskatchewan’s position was influenced by the international nature of the 
mechanisms designed to help countries meet their Kyoto obligations. 
 One approach to inserting these international factors, which are appearing in more and 
more policy fields, into Simeon’s theoretical framework is to categorize international influences on 
intergovernmental relations as a fifth major source of conflict alongside economic conflict, 
ideological conflict, political competition, and differing perspectives. Certainly the forthcoming 
case study of Kyoto would suggest that international influences have to be taken into account in 
examining Canadian intergovernmental relations. However, not all instances in intergovernmental 
relations involve international influences, and creating a fifth source may not be relevant in these 
cases to understanding federal-provincial relations.
 A second approach is to view international influences as a source of conflict that interacts 
with Simeon’s four sources of conflict, but which does not play a strong enough role to be 
considered a fifth major source of conflict. In this sense, international influences are better 
understood as a factor in determining the strength of a government’s opposition in any of Simeon’s 
four major sources. This thesis applies this view to the case study of Kyoto’s ratification. In doing 
so, the international influences themselves are broken down into more manageable components 
rather than remaining an abstraction that is difficult to effectively analyze. Applied in this manner, 
international influences can be effectively incorporated into Simeon’s analytical framework.
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2.6 Conclusion
 The purpose of this chapter was to frame the forthcoming case study of Saskatchewan’s 
perspective on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the federal government. Canada’s status as 
a federal state informs much of the political interaction that occurs between the federal government 
of Canada and the provincial governments in their respective regions. As a federation, Canada’s 
constitution defines the roles, responsibilities, limits and boundaries of both the provincial 
governments and the federal government. However, much of the political negotiation and the day-
to-day relationship between the governments is informed by the tone of intergovernmental 
relations. For example, unilateral action in a particular policy sphere by Ottawa will give a certain 
tone to intergovernmental relations, and consequently different results than cooperative action. The 
tonality of intergovernmental relations helps academics assess whether Canada’s two levels of 
government are modeling their interactions on either the consultative, coordinative, or 
collaborative forms of federalism. Bakvis and Skogstad’s cooperation versus confrontation 
continuum provides a framework for understanding these tones and trends in Canadian federalism. 
 Simeon’s framework is useful in providing a detailed framework for evaluating specific 
events and case studies in Canadian intergovernmental relations. Through Simeon’s framework it is 
possible to more easily identify how specific events shift the tone and nature of Canadian 
intergovernmental relations along Bakvis and Skogstad’s continuum. Therefore, Simeon’s 
identification of four sources of conflict in Canadian federal-provincial interaction, combined with 
Bakvis and Skogstad’s continuum, provide useful insight into how one level of government will 
react in a given policy sphere to initiatives put forward by the other level and how specific events 
can create trends in Canadian federalism.  While it is tempting to focus on one source of conflict - 
most prevalently economic conflict - Simeon reminds us that there are often more nuances to 
intergovernmental interaction, such as ideological conflict, political competition, and differences in 
perspective.
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CHAPTER 3:
UNDERSTANDING CONTEXT: 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND CANADA
3.1 Introduction
 Before tackling the Saskatchewan’s perspective on the 2002 ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol by the federal government, it is necessary to evaluate how past environmental policy in 
Canada has been conducted. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the constitutional division of 
powers in the field of environmental policy and explain where each level of government draws 
legal authority to make environmental policy. Next, two important court cases in environmental 
policy, the Crown Zellerbach case and the Friends of the Oldman River case, will be examined to 
explain how the Supreme Court has interpreted where each level of government’s responsibilities 
lie. The chapter will then proceed with an analysis of intergovernmental relations in the sphere of 
environmental policy. Finally, the science of climate change will be explained to provide context to 
the need for international and cross-jurisdictional cooperation among countries internationally, and 
Canada’s two levels of government domestically.
3.2 Environmental Policy and the Constitutional Division of Powers
 In Canada, responsibility over the regulation of environmental policy is shared by the 
provinces and the federal government. Environmental policy is not specifically assigned to either 
level of government in the constitution, and as a result has been termed a shared or concurrent 
power where jurisdiction lies with both levels of government (Friends of the Oldman River v. 
Canada [Minister of Transportation], 1992; Winfield and Macdonald, 2008: 266). The following 
section will seek to further expand and explain the legal regime in which environmental policy is 
conducted beginning with the importance of the Constitution Act 1867, followed with the basic 
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legal realities of environmental governance, and concluding with looking at the importance of legal 
precedents set in the 1988 Crown Zellerbach and 1992 Friends of the Oldman River court cases.
3.2.1 Constitution Act 1867
 Section 91 of the Canadian constitution outlines most of the powers and responsibilities of 
the federal government. Similarly, Section 92 outlines the powers and responsibilities of the 
provincial governments. These two sections largely determine the legal regime from which each 
level of government derives authority to act. Moreover, court decisions, derived from the division 
of powers in the Constitution Act 1867, have resulted in the federal government and the provinces 
sharing jurisdiction over environmental policy (Morton, 1996, 37). It is important to know and 
understand where each level of government derives its authority in environmental policy by 
examining relevant constitutional powers.
3.2.2 Provincial Jurisdiction
 The provincial governments of Canada derive their authority to act in environmental policy 
from a number of powers enumerated in the Constitution Act 1867. Provincial authority for 
environmental policy comes primarily from their jurisdiction over municipal affairs, property and 
civil rights, and matters of a local or private nature (Morton, 1996: 37). Additionally, provincial 
control over health policy is closely related to environmental policy. As well, much environmental 
regulation is categorized as falling under civil law, which is under provincial jurisdiction, as 
compared to criminal law, which is under federal jurisdiction (Morton, 1996: 38). Importantly, the 
property and civil rights powers of section 92 give provincial governments significant authority to 
create environmental regulations. Judicial interpretations of the limited extent of the federal 
government’s power over trade and commerce have allowed provincial governments substantial 
leeway in creating their own laws regulating labor, manufacturing, mining, land use, and other 
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economic matters, that have helped to inform environmental policy (Morton, 1996: 38). Control 
over natural resource development has also proved important in regulating environmental and 
energy policy. Provincial governments have also used powers over taxation to provide incentives 
for environmentally friendly practices through such initiatives as taxing gasoline or taxing other 
forms of pollution, but must be careful to frame them as regulatory charges and not indirect taxes 
(Valiante, 2002: 8).
3.2.3 Federal Jurisdiction
 Active engagement in environmental issues by Ottawa did not begin in earnest until the late 
1960s, and by that time the provincial governments had entrenched their role as environmental 
regulators. As a result, the federal government has had to accommodate its actions to the 
established patterns of environmental regulation developed by the provinces rather than pioneer 
new patterns (Morton, 1996: 41). The federal government derives much of its legal authority over 
environmental policy from legislative powers such as trade and commerce, its residual powers, and 
the “peace, order, and good government” clause as well as rights gained through proprietary 
ownership of federal lands (Valiante, 2002: 4). The trade and commerce powers of the federal 
government have been limited by restrictive judicial decisions over time unlike in other federal 
states, such as the United States. The efficacy of trade and commerce powers as the primary source 
of federal jurisdiction in environmental policy is questionable as a consequence (Morton, 1996: 
41). Ottawa has, previous to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, limited its action in 
environmental policy to conform with its other powers over commerce, criminal law, and peace, 
order, and good government. Nonetheless, as stated above, environmental policy has become a 
shared power, where some types of unilateral federal action may face legal limitations. As a 
consequence, administrative cooperation has served as the most important factor in mitigating 
conflict arising from the overlap between federal and provincial environmental regulation.
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 While the federal government’s role in environmental policy has been limited, it retains 
significant legal authority. As compared to the United States, Canada’s trade and commerce powers 
have been limited to interprovincial and international trade3, though the federal government retains 
a degree of authority over environmental policies that may affect more than one province (Morton, 
1996: 43). Additionally, the federal government has authority to regulate aviation, interprovincial 
and international transportation and communication and nuclear power (Morton, 1996: 43).
 The federal government receives some of its authority to regulate environmental policy 
based on the need to protect and promote fishing in Canada. The fisheries power allows Ottawa to 
regulate the type of substances that can be dumped in fish habitats (Valiante, 2002: 4). While this 
power does not extend to a general control over water pollution, the federal government need only 
link environmental damage to harm to the fisheries to have legal authority to enforce federal 
regulations (Morton, 1996: 44). 
 Closely related to fisheries is federal control over navigable waters and shipping. Any 
obstruction to navigable waters, even if these waters are entirely within a single province, requires 
the consent of the Minister of Transport. In addition, as a result of the Friends of the Oldman River 
case, the federal government has authority to conduct environmental reviews of projects, such as 
dams, that may affect more than one province (Valiante, 2002: 4). Regulations involving water 
quality can also be enacted through indirect means, such as targeted taxation (Morton, 1996: 44). 
 Nonetheless, the reach of federal jurisdiction in environmental policy is uncertain, 
according to Marica Valiante, because some aspects of the “peace, order and good government” 
clause of the constitution, have yet to be adequately defined either by practice or by the courts 
when it comes to environmental policy (2002: 4). For example, the POGG clause may be 
employed in the case of a national emergency or for policies of national concern (Valiante, 2002: 
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3 The provincial governments retain purview over economic activity that occurs solely within one 
provinces.
5). This power was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the Crown Zellerbach case and applies to 
both new areas of concern, such as nuclear power, and to old areas previously considered under 
provincial jurisdiction, but that have since become a matter of national concern (Valiante, 2002: 5). 
Primarily, the federal government gains authority through the POGG clause when a province 
cannot deal with a problem internally and when the externalities that result from this inability 
affect other provinces or international jurisdictions (Valiante, 2002: 5). 
 Jurisdiction over criminal law allows Ottawa to punish those whose actions endanger the 
health of Canadians. For example, Hydro-Quebec was prosecuted under criminal law for not 
reporting the dumping of polychlorinated biphenyls (Valiante, 2002: 5-6). As a result of this case, 
the Supreme Court effectively included environmental protection within the scope of criminal law. 
However, this power is limited by the high burden of proof required for criminal convictions 
(Morton, 1996: 43). For this reason, criminal law is ineffective in directly regulating environmental 
policy, but serves to bolster the federal government’s legal basis for involvement in that policy 
sector.
 The federal government also has treaty-making powers, which allow it to enter into 
international treaties with other states as a means of creating environmental regulations and 
policies. The Labour Conventions case of 1937 limits this power by asserting that the normal 
operating conditions of federalism apply and that the federal government must receive provincial 
support in areas of provincial competence (Morton, 1996: 45). 
3.3 Important Court Cases
 Several court cases are important in understanding responsibility for environmental policy 
and how the courts may interpret the federal government’s powers to sign and implement 
international agreements in the shared federal-provincial jurisdiction of environmental policy. The 
1988 Crown Zellerbach and the 1992 Friends of the Oldman River, referred to earlier, are two 
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cases that have extended federal authority over environmental policy while at the same time 
restricting the scope of provincial authority. These court cases also provide insight into some of the 
legal arguments regarding the role of the provincial and federal governments in the field of 
environmental policy. 
3.3.1 Crown Zellerbach
 The Crown Zellerbach case involves the dumping of woodwaste into Beaver Cove, BC by 
Crown Zellerbach Ltd. (R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, 1988). Crown Zellerbach was charged 
and found guilty under s. 4(1) of the federal Ocean Dumping Control Act. The resulting appeal of 
Crown Zellerbach, with both the Attorney Generals of Quebec and British Columbia intervening 
on the side of Crown Zellerbach, argued that the charges by the federal government were ultra 
vires of Parliament. The federal government argued that although Crown Zellerbach dumped the 
woodwaste in the internal waters of British Columbia, Ottawa, in fact, had jurisdiction to charge 
the company with dumping because Beaver Cove flowed into the Pacific Ocean. Uncontrolled 
dumping of waste in oceans and rivers, argued Ottawa, is a matter of national concern, because it 
has the potential to damage fish stocks and to violate Canada’s commitments to the 1972 UN 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter (R. v. 
Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, 1988).
 The federal government argued successfully before the Supreme Court that marine 
pollution was a matter of national concern. The Supreme Court agreed that the Oceans Dumping 
Control Act was not constitutionally supported by arguments centring on Parliament’s jurisdiction 
over seacoast and inland fisheries, but that it did qualify as constitutional because of the doctrine of 
national concern and the POGG powers of Parliament (R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, 1988). 
In its judgement, the Supreme Court also stated that use of the national concern doctrine only 
applies in cases of national emergencies or when a piece of legislation is of a “singleness, 
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distinctiveness, and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial 
concern” (R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, 1988). Additionally, if a provincial government that 
would normally have jurisdiction fails to legislate or chooses not to, and the matter of concern is 
extraprovincial and affects other jurisdictions then the federal government has a legal basis to 
intervene.
 Crown Zellerbach gives a legal precedent for the implementation of environmental policy 
by the federal government in areas normally considered under provincial jurisdiction. However, as 
Christopher Kukucha points out “although the decision was significant in terms of expanding 
POGG’s national concern provisions, the split ruling of the Court and the strong dissent of [Justice] 
La Forest weakened the precedent. Indeed, the Supreme Court has failed to elaborate on the 
national concern doctrine since the initial Crown Zellerbach decision” (Kukucha, 2005: 140). 
3.3.2 Friends of the Oldman River
 The 1992 Friends of the Oldman River v. Canada (Minister of Transportation) is another 
precedent setting Supreme Court decision that serves to expand the federal government’s authority 
over environmental policy (Friends of the Oldman River v. Canada [Minister of Transportation], 
1992). The Friends of the Oldman River Society was an environmental group that sought to have 
the federal government conduct an environmental assessment of a dam constructed by the Alberta 
government under federal regulations found in the Environmental Assessment and Review Process 
(EARP) Guidelines Order. The EARP Guidelines Order required an environmental review of 
projects that are within federal legislative authority, are funded by federal spending, and/or are 
using federal lands, which would practically include nearly all sizable projects (Morton, 1996: 49). 
Although the federal government was reluctant to accept the additional responsibility of 
conducting environmental assessments, the Supreme Court decided that the language contained 
28
within the EARP Guidelines Order was imperative and not discretionary and that federal law 
required the government to conduct environmental assessments. 
 Although the federal government was not eager to assume the responsibilities set out by the 
Supreme Court that it conduct environmental reviews, the case does show that the judiciary is 
receptive to examining arguments about jurisdiction over environmental matters. In particular, the 
Supreme Court showed a degree of willingness to expand the authority of the federal government 
to act in areas which had previously been considered exclusively provincial in nature (Morton, 
1996: 49). The Supreme Court was essentially acknowledging a role for the federal government in 
environmental policy in an expanding number of cases (Kukucha, 2005: 141).
3.4 Previous Intergovernmental Relations and Environment Policy
 Despite the complex nature of the legal authority each order of government is accorded 
under the division of powers, before the case of Kyoto’s ratification, there have been few instances 
of federal-provincial conflict (Harrison, 1996: 3). Environmental policy during the 1970s and 
1980s was conducted relatively cooperatively compared to other policy sectors, such as energy 
policy (Harrison, 1996: 3). In this early period of environmental regulation, policy was narrowly 
defined to encompass issues that could be confined to provincial jurisdictions. As a result, the 
federal government played a largely supportive role through research, technical assistance, and 
encouraging national standards (Harrison, 1996: 4). At the same time, provincial governments 
viewed the federal government suspiciously in the area of environmental policy because of the 
close relation environmental regulation has to control over natural resources, a power provincial 
governments guard carefully (Harrison, 1996: 5). The federal government was reluctant to assert 
authority in environmental policy because of the limited political and electoral gains compared to 
the potential political costs of challenging provincial authority in environmental policy. Likewise 
the federal government was cautious of the financial burden that would accompany greater 
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responsibilities in environmental policy (Harrison, 1996:5). As awareness of environmental 
problems such as climate change and air pollution, problems not easily addressed within provincial 
borders, has grown so too have calls for a greater federal role in environmental policy, and, 
consequently, the electoral disincentives of challenging provincial authority have declined.
 The governance of Canadian environmental policy has shifted to reflect growing awareness 
of environmental issues by the public. Scholars of Canadian environmental policy and federalism 
have identified a number of waves of activity in environmental policy. Grace Skogstad sees two 
major waves of environmental awareness and policy formation with the first beginning in the 
1970s and the second in the mid 1980s (1996: 103). The first wave of environmental regulation 
focused on environmental problems that were more local in nature, such as air and water pollution 
control and the management of natural resources. The second wave was focused on more national 
and global environmental concerns such as ozone depletion, climate change, and deforestation 
(Skogstad, 1996: 103). Skogstad sees one of the primary differences between these two waves as 
being the shift from “closed, elitist policy networks that permitted economic priorities to prevail” 
to a “more pluralist and open” policy setting process (1996: 103).
 Intergovernmental relations during both waves of environmental regulation were 
characterized by executive federalism. The first wave did not exhibit the type of major 
intergovernmental conflict that has characterized other policy sectors, such as natural resource 
policy or equalization. Many of the issues that arose during the 1970s and early 1980s did not force 
either level of government into political competition with each other for favorable public opinion 
(Skogstad, 1996: 105). Additionally, the policy focus was more closely on local and specific 
environmental problems, such as dumping rights or emissions standards at factories, rather than on 
major inter-jurisdictional environmental problems such as climate change. This concentration on 
local environmental issues helped to diffuse and marginalize the strength of broader environmental 
movements focused on climate change, for example (Skogstad, 1996: 105).
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 In contrast the second wave of environmental regulation and policy formation, beginning in 
the mid-1980s, has attracted more interest in and attention to problems related to non-territorially 
defined environmental degradation. Issues such as ozone depletion, toxic dumping, and climate 
change have gained, and solidified, a foothold on the broader public agenda. Significantly, and 
important to this thesis, international pressures and influences have been exerted on all levels of 
Canadian government to promote and protect a range of environmental issues (Skogstad, 1996: 
105). International pressure has naturally been felt most keenly at the federal level, and 
consequently with the addition of treaty obligations and legal precedents set through court cases, 
such as Crown Zellerbach and Friends of the Oldman River, the federal government has had more 
confidence asserting a positive role for itself in environmental policy both domestically and 
internationally. Additionally, environmental groups, both domestic and international, have brought 
increased public scrutiny to the environmental conduct of all levels of government and have shifted 
much of the policy debate on specific environmental questions from the limited policy circle of 
industry and government to a more open and participatory debate involving a wider range of 
stakeholders (Skogstad, 1996: 106).
 One of the first intergovernmental institutions that focused on environmental cooperation 
was the Canadian Council of Resource and Environmental Ministers (CCREM).4 Through this 
body an understanding was reached where by the federal government was largely responsible for 
providing scientific analysis, environmental research and other similar types of technical support 
for broad national standards while the provincial governments were responsible for implementing 
and enforcing agreements reached at CCREM meetings (Skogstad, 1996: 106; Harrison, 2000: 
5-6). Negotiated agreements, such as the Accords for the Protection and Enhancement of 
Environmental Quality, which provided provincial governments with the authority to enforce 
federal standards and regulations, characterized the environmental regime that grew through this 
31
4 The CCREM is now the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment. 
type of executive federalism and intergovernmental relations. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
closed policy circle of government and industry helped to mitigate intergovernmental conflict in 
environmental policy through a convergence of interests among political elites and the 
prioritization of local economic development. The political costs of impinging on established 
provincial jurisdiction in environmental policy, and the possibility of wading into murky 
constitutional waters without any major political benefits, kept the federal government from 
engaging in major environmental policy initiatives (Skogstad, 1996: 111).
 A general lack of environmental awareness by both citizens and government kept 
environmental regulation, and consequently intergovernmental interaction, to a minimum during 
the first wave; however, the second wave is characterized by an emergence of public interest in 
environmental policy and greater intergovernmental activity both formally and informally by all 
levels of government. With favorable decisions in the Crown Zellerbach and Friends of the 
Oldman River cases, the federal government had clearer authority to pursue legislative initiatives. 
For example, in 1988 the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) consolidated a number 
of federal environmental acts into one and sought to shift authority over the regulation of toxic 
substances to the federal government from the provinces based on the strong ruling in Crown 
Zellerbach (Skogstad, 1996: 114). Federal unilateralism in environmental policy was tempered by 
a move towards equivalency agreements that allowed provincial governments to keep their own 
laws if they were as stringent as those found in the CEPA (Skogstad, 1996: 114).  
 Since 1988 the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) has provided a 
forum dedicated exclusively to resolving intergovernmental conflicts and facilitating 
intergovernmental cooperation in environmental policy. The CCME has a permanent secretariat 
which helps to promote continuity in agenda and progress on environmental policy. Although 
iterations of the CCME have existed since 1961, it did not receive significant attention until 1988. 
Indeed, the 1990 Statement on Interjurisdictional Cooperation was a public statement on the 
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desirability for joint coordination on environmental issues and national consistency (Harrison, 
2000: 8). The CCME was also instrumental in advancing attempts at rationalizing the Canadian 
environmental protection regime by pursuing harmonization of environmental standards. 
Eventually, the work of the CCME led to the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental 
Harmonization in 1998.
 Harmonization was pursued at a time of budget retrenchment in the early 1990s and was 
seen as a cost-effective way of reducing the fiscal burden of environmental regulation in a period 
when public attention on the environment was waning (Harrison, 2000). Both levels of government 
were actively seeking to reduce duplication in the environmental field as a method to cut costs and 
ease the fiscal burden through the rationalization of environmental policy (Harrison, 2000: 8). The 
first attempt at harmonization, the 1995 Environmental Management Framework Agreement, 
ended in failure due to significant opposition from environmentalists who viewed the agreement as 
flawed and susceptible to gaps in regulation and loopholes. By 1996 preliminary agreement was 
reached by the CCME on a new Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization. The 
principal goal of this Accord was to promote rationalization of standards that have been reach 
through federal-provincial consensus (Harrison, 2000: 11). A significant sidebar to the 
implementation of the Accord was the federal government’s view that environmental 
harmonization policy was useful in demonstrating to Quebec, following the 1995 Referendum, that 
federalism can work to produce meaningful results (Harrison, 2000: 10-12).
3.5 The Science of Climate Change
 Climate change, as a public policy problem, is concerned with the human induced changes 
to both the Earth’s environment and atmosphere. While climate change itself is a natural 
phenomenon that has ebbed and flowed between cooling and warming periods throughout the 
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Earth’s history, recent industrial activity has caused a noticeable acceleration in a global warming 
trend according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)5 (IPCC, 2007a: 5).
 The study of climate change generally focuses on measuring the average temperature, 
precipitation, and wind patterns over a period of time and analyzing the trends and effects of 
changes compared to historical averages. Broadly speaking, changes in climate are attributable to 
the natural variance of internal climate systems, for example, normal patterns of precipitation and 
wind, and to external “forcings”, such as solar radiation, volcanic eruptions, and “human-induced 
changes in atmospheric composition” (IPCC, 2007b: 96). The resulting temperature changes, and 
the temperature’s ancillary effects on precipitation and wind patterns, are a result of the atmosphere 
absorbing energy from solar radiation. Roughly 30 per cent of solar radiation is naturally reflected 
by the Earth’s atmosphere, by cloud cover, by small particles known as aerosols, and by reflective 
surfaces.6 The remaining solar radiation is absorbed by the Earth’s surface and atmosphere. To 
provide a balance to this constant influx of energy, the Earth must radiate energy back into space 
from its surface through what is known as longwave radiation. A perfect equilibrium between the 
energy absorbed by solar radiation and the energy lost through longwave radiation would see an 
average surface temperature of approximately -19°C (IPPC, 2007b: 97). However, the Earth’s 
mean surface temperature is approximately 14°C and is caused by a natural greenhouse effect 
provided by particles and gases in the atmosphere. Water vapor and carbon dioxide are the most 
important of these substances and induce the majority of the greenhouse effect.
 The IPCC has concluded that mounting evidence from scientific observations has 
demonstrated that human-induced changes through the alteration of the atmosphere’s chemical 
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5 The IPCC is an international organization developed under UN General Assembly Resolution 
43/53 of 6 December 1988 that seeks to collect and organize scientific data from UN member 
nations on climate change to present balanced scientific information and recommendations to 
governments around the world.
6 Such as deserts, ice, and snow
composition are having a significant and long term effect on global temperature and climate 
systems (IPCC, 2007b: 105). The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, for example, has 
risen by 35 per cent since the beginning of the industrial era (IPCC, 2007b: 97). Human activity 
has caused this significant rise in carbon dioxide due primarily to deforestation and the burning of 
fossil fuels. Additionally, the Earth’s atmospheric circulation spreads greenhouse gases emitted 
through industrial activities from their sources and disperses them across the globe (IPCC 2007b: 
97). In this sense, changes in regional temperature and weather due to human activity cannot be 
confined to a single geographic location, but instead affect the entire global climate system.
 Each province in Canada faces different climate change effects, and because of this the 
federal government must accommodate a wide range of issues into its international approach 
towards climate change policy. The 2001 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, 
Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, outlines a number of potential 
impacts of climate change on the global environment. Concerning North America, the IPCC report 
raises a number of issues, among them rising overall temperatures and the increased frequency of 
heat waves, changes in lake, river, and precipitation levels, changes to drainage patterns, dangers to 
forests, and changing agricultural production patterns, as well the spread of infectious diseases 
(2001a: 737-739). Culturally, climate change may have severe impacts on Canada’s northern 
peoples, especially its traditional Inuit populations, “The impacts [of climate change] may be 
particularly disruptive for communities of indigenous peoples following traditional 
lifestyles” (IPCC, 2001a: 804).
 And, providing, an example of the effects of climate change at the provincial level, Joe 
Piwowar of the University of Regina argues that the province of Saskatchewan will face challenges 
due to changing weather patterns that include “extreme events, such as severe thunderstorms, 
tornadoes, hailstorms, and heatwaves” (2004: 8). When it comes to one of Saskatchewan’s leading 
industries, agriculture, Piwowar argues that, at the macro-economic level, climate change will have 
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a balanced effect on the agricultural production of prairie provinces: while lands in the southern 
region of Saskatchewan will become less productive they will be replaced by more productive 
lands in northern Saskatchewan. However, at the micro-economic level, while net provincial 
agricultural production will remain relatively stable, some individual landowners and farmers will 
be greatly affected by changes in temperature and moisture levels that are a consequence of global 
warming trends causing “tremendous strain on the social cohesion within agricultural families and 
communities” (2004: 10).  
3.6 Conclusion
 This chapter has sought to provide a summary of necessary background information on the 
constitutional role of Canada’s two levels of government in environmental policy, pre-Kyoto 
intergovernmental relations in environmental policy, and a summary of the science of climate 
change. The following chapter explores the international efforts to combat climate change and 
Saskatchewan’s perspective on Canada’s role in global climate change policy. Then Simeon’s four 
sources of conflict in Canadian intergovernmental relations will be used to structure a case study of 
the 2002 ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the federal government.
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: SASKATCHEWAN’S PERSPECTIVE
4.1 Introduction
 The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the government of Canada provides interesting 
insight into Canadian federalism’s ability to react to the complex nature of emerging public policy 
problems. As well, Canada has had a rich history of activism on the international stage, and 
environmentalism is no exception. The Kyoto Protocol presents an interesting case study of the 
interaction and impact of foreign policy and the politics of Canadian federalism. This chapter seeks 
to explain Canada’s role in the development of international policies on climate change. Secondly, 
it seeks to evaluate the perspective of the province of Saskatchewan towards the federal 
government’s commitments to the Kyoto Protocol. The fifth chapter will then apply Simeon’s 
framework to more closely identify the sources of Saskatchewan’s perspective.
4.2 Canadian Involvement in International Climate Change Policy
 Because of the serious nature of its effects, climate change has been pushed onto the 
international political agenda as a high priority. Additionally, the international community has 
adopted the idea of the prevention principle, also called the precautionary principle, as a guiding 
policy principle in dealing with global climate change. Therefore, serious and substantial efforts to 
successfully mitigate the causes of climate change requires the international cooperation of the 
world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters. 
 Climate change began to gain international attention in the late 1980s as scientific evidence 
began to mount regarding the effects of human made GHG emissions. Building on the success of 
the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which dealt primarily with ozone depletion, Canada took a leading 
role in advancing the climate change agenda by hosting the 1988 Toronto Conference, which 
helped provide the first framework recommendations for GHG emission reductions using 1988 as a 
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benchmark year (Smith, 1998: 2). Additionally, the formation of the IPCC, also in 1988, helped to 
provide detailed technical assistance to policy makers seeking to understand the effects of climate 
change. However, the first major step towards a formalized international environmental regime to 
address GHG emissions was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) negotiated during the June 1992 Rio Earth Summit. The UNFCCC sought to set 
targeted goals for the reduction of GHG emissions by signatories. To date 192 jurisdictions have 
ratified the UNFCCC.
 Resistance from large emitters, notably the United States, resulted in the UNFCCC being a 
largely symbolic convention. Concerns over the economic costs of pricing emissions, especially for 
energy intensive economies such as the United States, led to a weakening of the wording and 
commitments of the UNFCCC (Smith, 1998: 3). Ultimately, fears that the United States would pull 
out of the UNFCCC led to what Heather Smith calls an appeal to the “lowest common 
denominator” through non-binding targets and voluntary reporting and compliance (Smith, 1998: 
3).
 The follow up to the Rio Convention was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiated in Kyoto, 
Japan. Unlike the agreement reached at Rio, the Kyoto Protocol sets binding, rather than voluntary, 
targets for industrialized countries to reduce their GHG emissions from 1990 levels. For Canada 
this represents a reduction of six per cent from 1990 levels by 2012 (UNFCCC, July 20, 2009). In 
this environmental regime, countries are expected to reach their GHG reductions primarily through 
national measures.
 As a result, throughout the international negotiation process for both the UNFCCC and the 
subsequent December 1997 Kyoto Protocol, Canada supported objectives that took into account its 
economic interests and not just environmentally idealistic goals. For instance, Canada pushed for a 
legally-binding umbrella agreement that would include all major industrialized nations, especially 
the United States (Grubb, Hourcade and Oberthur, 2002: 27). Additionally, Canada sought to shift 
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the focus from per capita emissions of only CO2 to net emissions of a comprehensive list of GHGs, 
which helps to lessen the burden on Canada’s many energy intensive industries such as agriculture, 
mining, and oil and gas, by providing industry and government more flexibility in targeting a 
broader mix of gases (Kjellen, 1994: 158). Also Canada sought to lower its commitments through 
gaining credit for planting and protecting forests that serve as natural carbon sinks, and for 
providing more efficient energy options for other countries to reduce their GHG emissions through 
exporting hydroelectric power and cleaner burning natural gas (Smith, 1998: 4).
4.3 Saskatchewan’s Perspective on the Kyoto Protocol
 Saskatchewan, to state it briefly, during the run up to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
was a supporter of action to mitigate the effects of climate change and to scale back GHG 
emissions, but felt any mitigation measures that would threaten economic growth deserved careful 
consideration. In a position paper released by the Department of Energy and Mines in October 
2002, for example, the government of Saskatchewan stated its position as “willing to do its fair 
share to assist in accomplishing [the Kyoto] objectives, subject to a fair, equitable federal climate 
change plan being put in place that includes significant federal funding assistance” (Saskatchewan, 
2002a: 1). Due to the energy intensive nature of the province’s economy, however, the government 
of Saskatchewan was reluctant to fully commit to any binding environmental scheme without 
extensive consultation and a detailed and well-thought out implementation plan. Therefore, as a 
condition of Saskatchewan’s support for environmental initiatives by the federal government, 
Saskatchewan insisted there needed to be extensive dialogue among the provinces and the federal 
government.
 When the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 at the Fifth Conference of Parties to the 
UNFCCC in Kyoto, Japan, the province felt the federal government had acted hastily and had 
betrayed the trust of the provinces by agreeing to a more stringent carbon reduction scheme than 
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had earlier been agreed upon at a November 1997 Joint Meeting of Environment and Energy 
Ministers (JMM) in Regina.7 Specifically, at the 1997 JMM the provinces and Ottawa agreed to 
bargain in Kyoto for reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 (JMM, 1997). Only a few short 
weeks later the government of Canada agreed to a six per cent reduction below 1990 levels at the 
Kyoto conference. By contrast, Australia, a country with a comparable economic structure to 
Canada, was allowed to increase its emissions by eight per cent above 1990 levels (Greenspon, 
1997: A1; UNFCCC, 2009)
 Provincial leaders were frustrated with the lack of consultation by the federal government 
when it decided to unilaterally change Canada’s commitment from the agreed targets reached at the 
JMM. In reaction to this turn of events in Kyoto then Premier of Saskatchewan Roy Romanow 
stated: “[These events are] an example of the kind of confusion and stepping on each other's toes 
which this country simply doesn't need” (Greenspon, 1997: A1). 
 The federal government’s reaction to the opposition expressed by the provinces, notably 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, was to seek to mollify them by agreeing to consult with the provinces 
at a First Ministers Meeting in Ottawa held in December 1997. In the weeks after the signing of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Prime Minister Jean Chretien hosted a private dinner of provincial and territorial 
leaders in which he agreed to substantial consultations before Ottawa would move ahead with 
ratification (Bryden and Greenaway, 1997: A10). Resulting from the private dinner and First 
Ministers Meeting was a communique that stated: “First Ministers agreed to establish a process, in 
advance of Canada's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, that will examine the consequences of 
Kyoto and provide for full participation of the provincial and territorial governments with the 
federal government in any implementation and management of the Protocol” (FMM, 1997).
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7 JMM are intergovernmental meetings that are an expansion and extension of the earlier CCREM 
and CCME meetings discussed in Chapter 3.
 To follow up on the pledge to develop a consultative mechanism prior to any move to 
ratify, the first ministers directed their ministers of the environment and energy to work 
collaboratively to analyze the costs, options, and implications of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. At 
an April 24, 1998 JMM the federal government and the provinces agreed to work together through 
the creation of a National Climate Change Secretariat (JMM, 1998).
 By 2000 the government of Canada had produced the Government of Canada Action Plan 
2000 on Climate Change designed to reduce GHG emissions by 65 megatonnes and bring Canada 
approximately one third of the way to its Kyoto commitment (Canada, 2000: 2). This plan 
primarily outlined methods of GHG reductions in areas under federal jurisdiction and through the 
use of the federal spending power. For example, the federal government pledged to commit money 
to research into carbon capture and sequestration. However, Action Plan 2000 did little to outline 
specific regional impacts or the obligations of the individual provincial governments. In this sense, 
Action Plan 2000 provided little guidance to Canada’s provinces on how implementing Kyoto 
would affect them directly and left many questions that the provinces had about the impact of 
implementing Kyoto unanswered. 
 Demonstrating the confusion that surrounded the consultations into Canada’s 
implementation plans on climate change, in June 2002 Saskatchewan’s Premier Lorne Calvert 
described the province’s position to the Regina Leader Post by stating: "What we're saying is that 
before the ratification takes place, there are some key things that have to be assured,” adding 
further, “There has to be a fair distribution of costs. And there has to be a hard look at opportunities 
that exist (in terms of economic opportunities). The vast majority of Canadians are anxious that 
work be done to deal with global warming. This we believe offers a better opportunity than just 
being restricted to (four federal options)” (Parker 2002: F.5).
 Regardless of the concerns of the provinces regarding the federal government’s GHG 
reduction plans, Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced on September 2, 2002 at the World 
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Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, that Canada’s government 
would seek to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The provincial reaction to Chretien’s decision was 
immediately negative. Although provinces such as Manitoba and Quebec supported the principles 
of Kyoto they, along with other provinces such as Alberta and Saskatchewan, opposed ratification 
without consultation and a clear federal implementation plan. Reflecting Saskatchewan’s 
frustration, Industry and Resources Minister Eldon Lautermilch, Saskatchewan’s lead minister on 
the climate change file, stated: "we haven't seen a plan, we haven't seen an analysis of the costs and 
impacts" (Regina Leader Post, 2002: B.7). Lautermilch felt that the federal government had only 
paid “lip service” to involving the provinces, and that the decision to announce ratification was 
based on political factors and not pragmatism and economic factors (Lautermilch Interview, 2009). 
 Alberta was particularly outraged by Chretien’s decision to move ahead with ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol.  For example, the Alberta government spent nearly $2 million on a media 
campaign designed to raise opposition to the Kyoto Protocol (Canadian Press, 2002). Alberta 
Premier Ralph Klein even threatened a constitutional challenge of Ottawa’s actions to impose 
climate change policy on provincial governments, citing federal intrusion into the provinces’ 
constitutional control over natural resources (Olsen, 2002: A.3).
 Saskatchewan likewise had reservations about the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Climate change was viewed by the government of Premier Calvert as an import aspect of public 
policy. The March 14, 2002 Speech from the Throne stated that: “Saskatchewan people recognize 
the importance of climate change as an environmental and economic issue. Initiatives will be 
continued to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (Calvert, 2002a: 3). However, shortly before the 
Parliament of Canada moved to vote on a resolution approving the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, Premier Calvert stated his opposition to the government of Canada’s actions: “Our fight 
is not with the principle of Kyoto. Our fight is with the federal Liberal government who has 
refused from day one to participate with Canadians in building a sane implementation 
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plan that will protect the interests of the environment and the interests of the economy” (Calvert, 
2002b: 2861).
 Saskatchewan organized much of its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol around a 12 Point 
Plan reached by all the provincial and territorial governments during an October 28, 2002 JMM in 
Halifax. This agreement laid out 12 principles that the provinces and territories felt needed to be 
addressed and included in any national implementation plan put forward by the federal 
government.8 Saskatchewan was a strong supporter of the JMM agreement with Industry and 
Resources Minister Lautermilch introducing a motion that was subsequently passed by the 
Saskatchewan Legislature calling for the federal government to honour the 12 principles (SK 
Legislature, 2002). Among the principles of particular importance to Saskatchewan are point two: 
“the plan must ensure that no region or jurisdiction shall be asked to bear an unreasonable share of 
the burden and no industry, sector or region shall be treated unfairly”; point three: “the plan must 
respect Provincial and Territorial jurisdiction”; and point nine: “the plan must maintain the 
economic competitiveness of Canadian business and industry” (JMM, 2002).
 As can be seen, Saskatchewan’s position towards the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol can 
be characterized as reluctant and cautious. From Saskatchewan’s perspective, the federal 
government had acted prematurely and without proper or meaningful consultation, and as a result 
the economies of both Saskatchewan and Canada were threatened by Ottawa’s intention to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol without a concrete implementation plan. For these reasons, and more, 
Saskatchewan was brought into conflict with the federal government over the ratification of Kyoto.
4.4 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to provide context to the importance to Saskatchewan and 
Canada of the Kyoto Protocol and to frame Saskatchewan’s position towards Kyoto following 
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8 See Appendix A
Ottawa’s decision to move ahead with ratification. From the perspective of the government of 
Saskatchewan, it was important to develop a clear implementation plan prior to Canada ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol. The failure of the government of Canada to provide a detailed and achievable 
plan left Saskatchewan uncertain of the implications of Kyoto and pushed the Saskatchewan 
government to oppose Canada’s ratification of Kyoto. In the next chapter Simeon’s model of the 
four sources of conflict in Canadian intergovernmental relations will be used to analyze and 
categorize Saskatchewan’s motivations and disagreements with Ottawa in more depth.
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CHAPTER 5: SOURCES OF CONFLICT: 
SASKATCHEWAN’S PERSPECTIVE
5.1 Introduction
 The previous chapters have attempted to provide background information into Canadian 
federalism and theories of intergovernmental relations, environmental policy in Canada, the 
politics of climate change, and the government of Saskatchewan’s perspective on the ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol by Ottawa in 2002. This chapter will seek to provide a more in-depth analysis 
of Saskatchewan’s motivations for opposing Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 
examining Saskatchewan’s position through Simeon’s four sources of conflict: economic conflict, 
ideological conflict, political competition, and differences in perspective.
 Although uncertainty over the economic impact of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol was 
Saskatchewan’s greatest concern, aspects of the three other sources of conflict identified by 
Simeon helped to shape and mould Saskatchewan’s opposition. To achieve a complete 
understanding of Saskatchewan’s position on Kyoto’s ratification, it is best to look beyond 
economic factors and to incorporated Simeon’s other sources of conflict.
 This chapter will proceed by applying each of Simeon’s four sources of conflict to the case 
study of Saskatchewan’s perspective on Kyoto. First economic conflict will be examined following 
sequentially by ideological conflict, political competition, and finally differences in perspective. 
Throughout the analysis consideration is given to how international considerations played a role in 
each of the four sources identified by Simeon.
5.2 Economic Conflict
 As stated in Chapter 2, Simeon views economic interests as “the most obvious source of 
conflict among the governments” of Canada. It should come as no surprise then that 
Saskatchewan’s most prominent concern over the ratification of Kyoto involved economic 
concerns (2006: 163). Simeon’s analysis of economic conflict applied to the case study of 
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Saskatchewan’s perspective on Kyoto helps to explain several seemingly contradictory positions of 
the Saskatchewan government. 
 Indeed, from Saskatchewan’s perspective there were a variety of economic factors that 
influenced its opposition to the federal government’s approach to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. On 
the most basic level, the energy intensive structure of Saskatchewan’s economy meant its potential 
GHG reduction obligations relative to most other provinces were greater. At the same time, 
Saskatchewan was also concerned about the competitiveness of its economy relative to both other 
provinces and perhaps more importantly to competitors in the United States, especially after the 
United States had announced its refusal to ratify Kyoto. The uncertainty that resulted from the lack 
of a formal federal implementation plan also caused Saskatchewan to be drawn into conflict with 
the federal government over which level of government would be expected to cover costs of GHG 
reduction policies. In a similar vein Saskatchewan was also cautious when it came to possible 
implications for its ability to raise tax revenue and properly budget without a clear delineation of 
its responsibilities towards GHG reductions. Closely related to these financial considerations was 
the desire to protect provincial control over all aspects of resource policy and the associated 
revenue and economic clout generated by natural resource extraction. 
 To begin: Simeon acknowledges that a major “source of conflict based on economic 
differences arises from differences in the nature of provincial economies” (2006: 167). Applied to 
climate change policy, the differences in the economic structure and development of 
Saskatchewan’s economy reveal a heavy dependence on GHG intensive economic processes 
compared to most other provinces. Additionally, since 1990, the baseline year for Kyoto, 
Saskatchewan’s economy has rapidly developed and with this development has come rapid growth 
in GHG emissions. According to Environment Canada’s Greenhouse Gas Inventory: 1990-2002, 
Saskatchewan’s GDP had risen 23.3 per cent between 1990 and 2002 with GHG emissions rising 
in concert by 29 per cent over the same time period. Comparatively, Canada’s GDP had risen 40.0 
46
per cent and GHG emissions had risen 20.1 per cent. Saskatchewan’s per capita emissions in 2002 
were approximately 60 tonnes of GHG equivalent compared to the national average of 23.3 tonnes 
of GHG equivalent. In 2002 for every million dollars of economic activity generated in 
Saskatchewan two kilotonnes of GHGs were emitted. In comparison, the national average over this 
period was 0.68 kilotonnes GHG per million dollars of economic activity (Canada 2002a). Placed 
in these statistical terms, Saskatchewan faced some of the most burdensome economic obligations 
of all the provinces when it came to possible ratification of Kyoto in 2002.
Table 5.1: Comparative Table of GHG Emissions and Economic Activity
GHG 
Emissions per 
Capita 2002
Rise in GHG 
Emissions 
1990-2002
Rise in 
GDP 
1990-2002
GHG Intensity 
(Million tonnes/
$Billion GDP)
2002
Canada 23.3 tonnes 20.1% 40.4% 0.68
Saskatchewan 60.0 tonnes 29.0% 23.3% 2.0
Manitoba 18.8 tonnes 6.4% 24.9% 0.635
Alberta 73.3 tonnes 29.4% 52.4% 1.756
Source: Canada’s Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990-2002
 During the 2002 ratification debate, the potential economic impact of meeting Canada’s 
GHG reductions targets under Kyoto was predicted to lead to substantial costs to the Canadian 
economy. A federal-provincial-territorial task force placed the economic impact of implementation 
at nearly $40 Billion or approximately 3 per cent of 2010 GDP (Canada, 2002: 57).  Likewise, 
business groups in 2002 went as far as to argue that the effects of implementation would amount to 
nearly 450,000 lost jobs across Canada (Canadian Association of Exporters and Manufacturers, 
2002). Due to Saskatchewan’s rapid growth of GHG emissions from 1990 to 2002, meeting the 
Kyoto commitments would mean that, relative to population, Saskatchewan would pay a greater 
cost to meet its targets than other provinces.
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 Another example of one of the differences between Saskatchewan’s economy and the other 
provinces is its reliance on coal for electrical generation, which places it at a disadvantage to 
provinces with cleaner GHG emitting forms of electrical generation, such as nuclear, natural gas, 
or hydroelectric generation. Indeed, the discrepancy that exists among Canadian provinces 
regarding GHG emission intensity per unit of economic activity can largely be attributed to 
whether a provinces is either a hydrocarbon producer or a hydroelectric producer. Provinces that 
are dependent upon the production and exportation of oil and other energy products, as well as the 
generation of their power primarily through coal-fired generation, have dramatically higher 
greenhouse gas emissions than provinces that generate the majority of their economic activity from 
industries other than the energy sector and that produce their energy primarily through nuclear 
power or hydroelectric generation.  For Saskatchewan the generation of much of its economic 
activity requires substantial reliance on non-renewable sources of energy, such as coal, that emit 
disproportionate amounts of greenhouse gases compared to hydroelectric generation. Indeed, 
SaskPower, Saskatchewan’s largest electricity company, estimated that compliance with the Kyoto 
Protocol could have cost the Crown corporation between $50 million and $250 million annually 
(Regina Leader Post, 2002: B7). For Saskatchewan the economic impact of reducing emissions 
solely in the electrical generation field would have had substantial costs and these potential costs 
contributed to Saskatchewan’s opposition to ratification.
 Likewise, the oil and gas sector of Saskatchewan’s economy was especially concerned 
about the implications for its continued vibrancy and growth if the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol caused costs to rise drastically. In 2002 the value of Saskatchewan’s oil related production 
amounted to $4.7 billion, a dramatic growth from the year of Kyoto’s negotiation in 1997, $2.9 
Billion, and the target year for reductions of 1990, $1.6 billion (Saskatchewan, 1997: 2; 
Saskatchewan, 2002: 2). Saskatchewan’s production of petroleum products is also weighted 
towards GHG intensive methods of oil extraction. For example, in 2002 Saskatchewan’s heavy 
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gravity oil production was 12.3 million m3, medium gravity was 6.9 million m3, and light gravity 
was 5.1 million m3 (Saskatchewan, 2003: 19). Heavy oil, having a greater density than medium or 
light oil, requires more energy and water to extract than either light or medium oil, resulting in 
greater GHG emissions (Canada, 2010). As a result, the major players in Saskatchewan’s energy 
sector and economic think tanks lobbied both the provincial and federal governments to delay the 
ratification of Kyoto until an extensive implementation plan could be developed. For example, the 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers sent an open letter to the federal government in late 
October of 2002 stating: "we have seen no evidence that it makes sense for Canada to make its 
contribution to climate change action under the Kyoto Protocol" (Seskus, 2002: FP.3). Gwyn 
Morgan, CEO of the oil and gas company Encana Inc., wrote: “[Kyoto] would go down in history 
as one of the most damaging international agreements ever signed by a Canadian prime 
minister" (Girard, 2002: F.01).
 For these reasons, the government of Canada’s decision to move forward with ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol raised major questions about the resulting economic impact on 
Saskatchewan, given its energy intensive economy compared to other provinces. As Simeon’s 
framework would predict, a portion of Saskatchewan’s economic conflict with the federal 
government was a result of the differences in its economy compared to other provinces.
 Simeon’s analytical framework can also be built upon and expanded by including 
international economic influences as a determinant of intergovernmental conflict in Canadian 
federalism. One critical economic concern of the government of Saskatchewan was its ability to 
compete internationally against jurisdictions that decided against adopting the Kyoto Protocol and 
would therefore, as a result, have lower emissions standards. In particular, the government of 
Saskatchewan had concerns over economic consequences of the Bush Administration’s opposition 
to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. "President Bush has said they are not going to ratify or adhere to 
Kyoto," Calvert said. "We need to be sure that somehow that does not create an unfair 
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circumstance for our energy-producing industry" (O’Connor, 2002: B:1). Likewise, Mexico, the 
other partner in the North American Free Trade Agreement, had no obligations to alter its behavior 
according to the principle of differentiated responsibility acknowledged in the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNFCCC, 2010).
 International competitiveness was emphasized in the federal-provincial Analysis and 
Modelling Group’s 2000 paper, An Assessment of the Economic and Environmental Implications 
for Canada of the Kyoto Protocol, which argued that the economic consequences of Canada’s 
ratification would cause more harmful affects to Saskatchewan’s economy than to other provinces’ 
economies (AMG, 2000, 50). While the paper did not make reference to each province 
individually, it stated that nationally Canada would drop in relative competitiveness to its trading 
partners - amounting to a loss of approximately 0.5 per cent of GDP (AMG, 2000: 50). Estimates 
of the costs to the Saskatchewan economy by 2010 under the numerous scenarios analyzed by the 
taskforce ranged from $1.3 billion to $3.0 billion (AMG, 2000: 38). Similarly, in its October 2002 
position paper the government of Saskatchewan estimated the annual costs of Kyoto’s ratification 
and implementation to the Saskatchewan economy at between $300 million to $2.6 billion annually 
by 2020 (Saskatchewan, 2002: 12).
 International competitiveness for Saskatchewan business was a major concern for the 
government of Saskatchewan after business groups emphasized some of the major negative 
implications of ratification. For example, Ipsco Inc., a steel manufacturer based in Regina, made 
clear in interviews to the Regina Leader Post that energy rate increases as a result of the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol could result in the relocation of its core Regina business, 
which in 2002 had approximately 700 Regina based employees (Johnstone, 2002: B.4). Speaking 
in reaction to Ipsco’s announcement, and reflecting the views of Saskatchewan business, Regina 
Chamber of Commerce director John Hopkins said: "Kyoto will have a devastating impact on the 
Saskatchewan economy. It puts us at a huge disadvantage. It's a bad deal for all of us.” (Johnstone, 
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2002: B.4). Saskatchewan Industry and Resources Minister Eldon Lautermilch is quoted in the 
Regina Leader Post as saying: "[Kyoto’s ratification will] put us at a huge competitive risk," 
adding, "The U.S. represents just under 90 per cent of Canadian exports. And that could threaten 
jobs in (Saskatchewan's) potash industry, since the Americans are our largest buyer of potash. It 
could also affect the oil and gas industry since Saskatchewan is the second-largest producer of oil 
and gas in the country" (Foster, 2002: A.1).
 Reflecting its concerns over the effects ratification of Kyoto would have on the 
competitiveness of Saskatchewan companies relative to firms based in the United States, the 
government of Saskatchewan stated as part of its official position paper: 
The plan should maintain the economic competitiveness of Saskatchewan’s businesses 
and industries. Trade with the United States and other nations is critical to Saskatchewan’s 
economy. Saskatchewan is concerned that ratification of the Kyoto Protocol may reduce 
Canada’s economic competitiveness since 87% of Canada’s exports go to the U.S. The 
U.S. has indicated it will not ratify the Protocol. If Canada ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, 
Saskatchewan companies may be placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to U.S. 
companies that may not have to reduce their emissions. Saskatchewan companies can 
easily move to the U.S. or manufacturing activity can easily shift from Saskatchewan to 
U.S. plants as relative costs change. As well, many other countries are not yet covered by 
the Protocol and may enjoy a competitive advantage in competing for U.S. or Canadian 
markets (Saskatchewan 2002: 13).
 The Saskatchewan government, then, had a clear goal of defending its economic interests 
when it came to negotiating with the federal government and the other provincial governments. 
This quickly brought the government of Saskatchewan into conflict with the federal government 
over economic concerns. The tactics used by these two governments reflected these economic 
concerns. As Simeon predicts, partisan discussion, or trying to “structure the discussion in terms 
favourable to themselves” (2006: 243) played an important role in the economic debates put 
forward by both levels of government.
 At the very basic level the two governments presented conflicting narratives of climate 
change and the appropriate policy necessary to successfully deal with the implications. From the 
perspective of the Saskatchewan government, the federal government attempted to position itself 
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as the “champion of the environment” and the provincial governments, including Saskatchewan, 
that opposed Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto protocol as “Neanderthals” according to then 
Energy and Mines Minister Lautermilch (Lautermilch Interview, 2009). In contrast, the 
Saskatchewan government attempted to frame itself more favourably as the pragmatic and cautious 
policy maker that sought to fully understand and account for all the economic implications of 
Kyoto’s ratification. From Saskatchewan’s perspective it was important to define the debate in 
economic terms rather than in emotional or altruistic terms, such as the negative impact of climate 
change on traditional peoples in the North or the negative effects on disadvantaged peoples abroad. 
Defining the terms of the debate was especially critical because, as Simeon suggests, “the act of 
definition suggest that the problem will be viewed from a certain perspective. A particular set of 
precedents, prior experiences, arguments, and general rules will be called into play and will 
structure future action” (2006: 243). An example of this type of economic framing by 
Saskatchewan can be found in Minister Lautermilch’s statements in the Saskatchewan legislature:
[I]t has become very clear to us that the Kyoto Protocol in its current form will not do 
that; that this protocol could have grave consequences for our provincial economy, for the 
jobs and lives of our citizens and their children, and that the federal Liberal government in 
Ottawa is not committed to public consultation, to regional fairness, or economic 
development outside certain centres — in short, that the government of Ottawa is not 
committed to Saskatchewan (Lautermilch, 2002a: 2865). 
 Similarly, the Saskatchewan government attempted to portray the federal government as 
ignoring the provinces and refusing to consult. In its October 2002 position paper one of the 
fundamental demands of the Saskatchewan government was that: “Stakeholders and residents 
should have an opportunity for full and informed input into the development of the plan and the 
ratification decision (Saskatchewan, 2002: 10).” In this context, Saskatchewan’s desire for 
extensive consultation was also extended to include other stakeholders beyond government 
including, perhaps most critically, business interests. Additionally, the demands found in this 
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position paper were an attempt to organize the procedure that the federal government ought to 
follow to benefit, and to receive the support of, the Saskatchewan government.
 Saskatchewan government’s framing of the discussion was no more clearly stated than in 
the ending to its position paper in which it states under the title “A Call to the Federal 
Government” that: 
Saskatchewan has outlined the features that it feels need to be included in a fair, open and 
sensible national plan to address climate change.
 
Saskatchewan calls upon the federal government to immediately resume discussions with 
the provinces to develop the details of such a national climate change plan. 
Saskatchewan calls upon the federal government to consult with Canadians about this 
national climate change plan before making a decision on ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol.  (Saskatchewan, 2002: 18)
 Similarly, Ottawa’s reluctance to outline a comprehensive climate change plan can be 
linked to its desire to have the debate narrowly limited to a focus on environmental and health 
benefits of climate change abatement. The federal government appeared to marginalized the 
economic concerns of the provinces and industries opposed to ratification as a way of sustaining 
public support by obscuring the potential costs to citizens and instead emphasizing the health and 
environmental benefits. The obscuring of the economic costs of ratification corresponds with 
Simeon’s observations that “participants will try to withhold or downplay information 
unfavourable to their positions” (Simeon, 2006: 246). 
 Building upon this attempt to define the issue in economic terms, Saskatchewan was a 
strong supporter of the 12 Point Plan jointly issued by all provincial governments and territories 
following the October 28, 2002 JMM (JMM, 2002).9 The 12 Point Plan, along with 
Saskatchewan’s position paper, were meant to provide a narrower framework to guide climate 
change policy development in the federal government towards policies beneficial to Saskatchewan, 
and by extension the other provinces. In other words, these position statements were meant to force 
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9 See Appendix A.
the federal government to argue in the economic terms defined by the government of 
Saskatchewan. This follows Simeon’s analysis of partisan discussion, which suggests that: “when 
the terms of an argument are defined, the range of possible outcomes is drastically reduced” (2006: 
243). 
 Applying Simeon’s frameowrk would suggest that Saskatchewan’s support of the 12 Point 
Plan sought to create a bargaining position that would maximize financial resources for the 
province. Two points in particular emphasize this position:
“The plan must ensure that no Province or Territory bears the financial risk of federal 
climate change commitments”;
and,
“The plan must ensure that no region or jurisdiction shall be asked to bear an unreasonable 
share of the burden and no industry, sector or region shall be treated unfairly. The costs 
and impacts on individuals, businesses and industries must be clear, reasonable, 
achievable, and economically sustainable. The plan must incorporate appropriate federally 
funded mitigation of the adverse impacts of climate change initiatives” (JMM, 2002). 
For Saskatchewan these two points were vital components of its approach to negotiating a national 
climate change regime. The rapid growth of GHG emissions in Saskatchewan after 1990 meant 
that efforts to reduce its GHG emissions to achieve Kyoto’s targets would mean a nearly 35 per 
cent reduction in absolute emissions across the province. Advocating for a strong national plan that 
included the input and agreement of the provincial governments, with associated federal funding, 
was essential to securing Saskatchewan’s economic future. In this sense Saskatchewan desired a 
strong federal plan that would help to redistribute some of the burden of GHG reductions to other 
jurisdictions in Canada. The NDP’s Andrew Thomson argued just this point on March 19, 2002, in 
the Saskatchewan Legislature: 
It is unfortunate that the Kyoto Protocol sets as the target to reduce below the 1990 levels. 
This puts Saskatchewan at something of a disadvantage because our industrial growth was 
after that time period. We need to work with Ottawa, we need to work with our national 
government, with other provinces, and with industries to set realistic targets for the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. We need to clearly understand what the impacts 
are going to be on the province in terms of its environment, on the province in terms of its 
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economy, and on the citizens who live here in terms of what the impact would be in terms 
of the consumers. That is the approach that we are continuing to work on as we work with 
Ottawa on this very important issue. (Thomson, 2002: 115). 
Similarly, Saskatchewan’s position paper on climate change argues:
The plan should recognize the difficult financial circumstances of Saskatchewan and other 
provinces and should provide federal cost-sharing to provinces to assist them to undertake 
required climate change initiatives. (Saskatchewan, 2002: 16);
and,
Saskatchewan believes that it will be extremely difficult for the federal government to 
fairly allocate the impact of emission reduction measures among provinces or economic 
sectors. Accordingly, Saskatchewan feels that the federal government should commit that 
it would provide compensation if Saskatchewan, another Canadian jurisdiction, or an 
economic sector bears a disproportionate share of the burden of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions to meet Canada’s Kyoto target. The plan should not selectively impose 
significant additional burdens on a narrow group of individuals or businesses beyond 
reasonable costs to effectively reduce emissions (Saskatchewan 2002: 17). 
For these reasons it was important for Saskatchewan that a national plan that acknowledged its 
post-1990 growth and the energy intensive structure of its economy be developed. 
 Saskatchewan’s view of a strong federal role in a comprehensive national climate change 
plan in many ways parallels classic federal provincial debates over equalization policy identified 
by Simeon (2006: 164). Only, in the case of climate change policy, the GHG intensive economies 
in Canada such as Saskatchewan and Alberta sought to equalize GHG reductions among provinces, 
while GHG efficient provinces such as Manitoba and Quebec sought to prevent this redistribution 
of the burden of GHG reductions away from the most egregious emitters. Indeed, Saskatchewan’s 
position paper makes it desire for a national plan clear: “Policies to meet national objectives such 
as the Kyoto Protocol should be nationally based and should be designed so that the average 
burden is relatively even across the country and across the economy” (Saskatchewan, 2002: 11). 
 Nonetheless, this desire for a national role for the federal government in easing the 
financial burden of GHG reductions was balanced against the goal of retaining Saskatchewan’s 
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control over its economy, and especially complete control over its natural resources. Control over 
natural resource revenue and regulation has always been a source of conflict between the Western 
provinces and the federal government - especially when considering the past policies of the federal 
government, such as the National Energy Plan (NEP). Simeon acknowledges the historical 
suspicion of the Western provinces towards federal policies: “Throughout Canadian history 
westerners have resented national trade, tariff, and freight-rate policies which were seen as 
protecting eastern manufacturing industries” (2006: 167). The debate leading up to ratification was 
no exception, with Saskatchewan arguing that federal climate change policy ought to “respect 
provincial jurisdiction, including provincial ownership of natural resources” (Saskatchewan 2002: 
11). 
 For Saskatchewan’s negotiators there was always the fear that implementation of climate 
change plans through some form of carbon tax or trading scheme to meet Canada’s Kyoto 
obligations would resulting in a “sucking out of resources” (Wilson Interview, 2009). Minister 
Lautermilch emphasized that Saskatchewan was cognizant that climate change policy could 
become some form of a “new NEP” that would result in a “redistributing wealth shift” as resource 
revenue generated in Saskatchewan would flow to other Canadian jurisdictions (Lautermilch 
Interview, 2009). Saskatchewan puts it position clearly:
Saskatchewan is committed to taking action on climate change. But we are not willing to 
have our residents and industries pay a price disproportionate to that paid by other 
Canadians. Nor are we willing to accept a plan that penalizes our economy but fails to 
effectively address climate change. It is time for the federal government to have an open 
discussion with all Canadians on Kyoto and its implementation plan (Saskatchewan, 2002: 
9).
Similarly, the position paper later states:
Saskatchewan, along with other Canadian jurisdictions, is concerned that ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol will eventually result in federal intrusion into the management and 
taxation of resource industries that are currently the responsibility of the provinces. This 
could transfer significant amounts of resource revenues from a province to the federal 
government. Saskatchewan feels that provincial resource revenues now used to fund 
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services to provincial residents should not be taxed away by the federal government under 
the guise of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Saskatchewan, 2002: 16).
 When all these economic arguments are summarized and connected, it becomes easier to 
understand the reasons the Saskatchewan provincial government decided to oppose the 2002 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. In short, Saskatchewan was trying to maximize its economic 
position by mitigating the potential costs to its established industries and economy, maintain its 
international competitiveness relative to the United States, maximize federal contributions to GHG 
reduction programs, ensure that the provincial government maintained strong control over natural 
resources and had extensive input over the direction of economic policy affecting Saskatchewan. In 
terms of Simeon’s analysis, economic conflict arose because of the differences in Saskatchewan’s 
economy compared to other provinces, its desire for certainty in federal funding programs, its 
demand to retain control of its natural resources, and its concerns over international 
competitiveness. 
5.3 Ideological Conflict
 Along with economic conflict, Simeon’s evaluation of federal-provincial relations also 
identifies ideology as an important source of conflict between governments. Simeon’s analysis 
provides a guide to understanding the role and importance of ideological factors in the federal-
provincial negotiation and how these ideological factors helped to drive intergovernmental conflict 
during the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. According to Simeon there are two primary 
categories of ideological factors in federal-provincial negotiations: “first are prescriptions about the 
nature of the political system, the proper balance of the governments within it, and the ways the 
decision process should operate; second are more substantive aspects relating to the kinds of policy  
goals the system should pursue” (Simeon, 2006: 168). Or, in other words, there are ideological 
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conflicts over the ideological and philosophical motivations of policy makers as well as ideological 
conflicts over how federal-provincial relations ought to be conducted.
 The first type of ideological conflict during the ratification debate was over the motivations 
and priorities of policy makers at the federal level compared to those at the provincial level. The 
primary ideological difference between the federal government and the government of 
Saskatchewan rested on the weight ecological concerns ought to have compared to the weight 
economic development ought to have in determining environmental policy. In the case of the 
ratification of Kyoto, this type of ideological clash occurred over the more pragmatic and 
economically focused position of Saskatchewan, versus the more environmentally idealist and 
ideologically focused position of the federal government. The federal government demonstrated its 
commitment to the protection of the environment and reductions in the emissions of GHGs because 
of its adherence to the international treaty known as the Kyoto Protocol - parts of which were 
clearly designed to benefit developing countries at a cost to industrialized countries. Saskatchewan, 
in contrast, had a commitment to sustained economic development, while taking economically 
cautious steps to address environmental concerns over climate change and GHG emissions in a 
manner that was most economically beneficial to Saskatchewan. 
 During the federal-provincial negotiations following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997 and leading up to the ratification of Kyoto in 2002, the government of Saskatchewan felt that 
the federal government used an ideological approach laced with idealistic rhetoric towards climate 
change, which caused Saskatchewan to criticize Ottawa’s approach for being light on practical, 
measured, and reasoned implementation plans. For example, on the day the federal government 
voted to ratify the Kyoto Protocol Saskatchewan’s Minister of Industry and Resources, Eldon 
Lautermilch, stated in the Saskatchewan legislature: 
[W]e have the federal plan before us. A plan... [that] is better described as a goal, a wish, a 
dream, a hope that would be nothing but bad news for the people of Saskatchewan. Mr. 
Speaker, the federal climate change plan is not a real plan. It contains no details, no 
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specific information, and no realistic cost estimates. Sounds kind of familiar, Mr. Speaker, 
but I don’t think that’s what we need here in this province (Lautermilch, 2002b: 2866).
Indeed, for the government of Saskatchewan, the federal government’s rush to ratification was 
characterized by Minister Eldon Lautermilch as an “ideological decision, but without firm 
commitments [to an implementation plan]” (Lautermilch Interview, 2009). Similarly, during 
intergovernmental meetings such as JMMs and federal-provincial committees, Saskatchewan felt 
that the federal government’s ideological thrust towards ratification meant they were unprepared 
for the serious discussions revolving around implementation. Indeed, Minister Lautermilch 
reflected that these meetings were “difficult because they never went anywhere” because he felt the 
“federal government was not contributing” and that lack of substantive contribution led to “little 
progress” through the intergovernmental committee process (Lautermilch Interview, 2009).
 Furthermore, the ideological nature of Ottawa’s stance on climate change was reflected in 
discord within the federal cabinet where there was dissension by those who favoured a more 
prudent approach to climate change, one that took greater account of potential negative economic 
consequences. For example, federal Health Minister Anne Mclellan threatened to resign if Kyoto 
had negative economic effects on the Albertan economy (Toulin, 2002: A.4). Similarly, just days 
after the announcement that Ottawa intended to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, Paul Martin was quoted 
by the National Post as saying: 
I don't think we should kid ourselves. There are costs to dealing with climate change 
(Sokoloff, 2002: A.5).
And,
Canadians are entitled to know what those costs are, what they are going to be asked to 
bear and that it's going to be done in a way that is equitable and fair, right across the 
country, region by region (Sokoloff, 2002: A.5). 
In the end, the ideological position of the Prime Minister and the other supporters of the Kyoto 
protocol won the day over those wanting more pragmatism - hence the ideological thrust by 
Ottawa in choosing to make a unilateral move to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
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 The federal government’s more ecologically idealist position is typical of an ideological 
trend in Canadian environmental policy towards “deep environmentalism” as described by Melody 
Hessing, Michael Howlett, and Tracy Summerville (2005: 7). Deep environmentalism and other 
similar environmentally centred ideologies adhere to the belief that priority should be given to 
“environmental concerns over market forces” (Hessing, Howlett and Summerville, 2005: 7). Those 
that hold the deep ecologist viewpoint argue that the natural environment should not be categorized 
simply as a resource for exploitation, but as a natural system with deep connection to and for 
human beings. Deep environmentalists encourage public policy to be developed with the health of 
natural systems as a primary consideration, equal to the concern with economic development. 
Evidence of the influence of deep environmentalism in general environmental policy can be found 
in the adoption of the “precautionary principle” by many levels of government when it comes to 
environmental assessments and the inclusion of “environmental sustainability” in public policy 
discourse (Hessing, Howlett and Summerville, 2005: 189). 
 It is always difficult to separate normal political rhetoric from deeply held ideological 
beliefs, but in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the federal government’s ideological commitment to 
climate change policy as an environmental imperative can be seen reflected in Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien’s contemporary statements and in his memoirs. Tellingly, Chretien’s memoirs relate his 
deep feelings about environmental stewardship: “Protecting the environment had been a personal 
preoccupation of mine ever since I was put in charge of Canada’s national parks in 1968 as 
Minister of Indian affairs and northern development” (2007: 383). Likewise, his predilection for 
environmental protection over more purely hard-nosed goals of economic development is reflected 
in this statement in the section of his memoirs dealing with the ratification of Kyoto: “In all my 
forty years in public life, I’ve never once seen a sector coming to the government and asking us to 
increase the taxes it’s paying so that the country can be better (Chretien, 2007: 388). Similarly in 
parliamentary debates and questions throughout 2002, Prime Minister Chretien stated: “We must 
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respect our international obligations and we must respect the desire of Canadians to do something 
about climate change” (Canada Hansard, 2002: Oct 19). All of these statements serve to 
demonstrate the priority Chretien placed on environmental protection and making and fulfilling 
international commitments, such as the Kyoto Protocol.
 Environmentalism as an ideology played a role in the policies of the Saskatchewan but, in 
contrast to the federal government, Saskatchewan was more disposed to emphasize continued 
economic stability and growth over purely ecological concerns. Saskatchewan’s 2002 position 
paper on Kyoto reflects the preeminence of economic concerns: “While the Saskatchewan 
government supports many of the principles and objectives of the Kyoto Protocol, Saskatchewan is 
seriously concerned about the lack of information regarding Ottawa’s intentions” (Saskatchewan, 
2002: 1). Likewise Premier Calvert’s statement of December 10, 2002 in the Saskatchewan 
Legislature also reflect the priorities of the Saskatchewan government.:
From day one, Mr. Speaker, this government has made it clear we do not — we do not — 
oppose the principles and objectives of the Kyoto Protocol, do not object to taking on the 
challenge of greenhouse gas emissions. Our fight is not with the principle of Kyoto. Our 
fight is with the federal Liberal government who has refused from day one to participate 
with Canadians in building a sane implementation plan that will protect the interests of the 
environment and the interests of the economy (SK Hansard, 2002: 2861).
Saskatchewan officials believed that climate change policy ought to preserve economic growth in a 
manner that also addresses environmental concerns - climate change policy that did not adequately 
protect Saskatchewan’s economy was viewed dimly.
 As a result, in the context of actual intergovernmental negotiations that occurred both on 
the political and bureaucratic level, Saskatchewan officials were left with the impression that 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol was motivated by ideological beliefs. Additionally, from the 
perspective of Minister Lautermilch, the federal government was inflexible due to its ideological 
commitment to ratification, “Federal Liberals got insensitive as time went on and were less 
inclined to listen” (Lautermilch Interview, 2009). Some of the reasoning behind the federal 
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government’s reluctance to continue negotiations is found in Chretien’s memoirs regarding the 
Kyoto Protocol: “I thought it was important first to establish an obtainable target and then to figure 
out how to meet it step by step, year by year. The fact is, if you have no set destination in mind, 
you’ll never get anywhere” (388). 
 Another distinct, although related, major source of ideological conflict during Kyoto’s 
ratification involved the ideological expectations of politicians about the nature of Canada’s federal 
political system itself and the traditions and norms of federal-provincial relations. Exploring these 
expectations about the nature of the political system helps to explain the opposition of 
Saskatchewan to the federal government’s unilateralism in climate change policy. In the case of 
Kyoto, this type of ideological conflict arose from the strongly held belief in cooperative 
federalism by provincial governments. This is a historically important ideological position of the 
provinces as explained by Simeon: “The provinces are also strong believers in cooperative 
federalism. The federal government must be sensitive to regional needs. It must fully consult with 
the provinces before introducing policies that affect them” (Simeon, 2006: 182).
 As a consequence, ideological beliefs about the nature of the federal system and the 
constitutional division of powers between the provinces and Ottawa generally determine the type 
of tactics that governments will pursue in federal-provincial negotiations. In the case of climate 
change policy, these ideological views held by both levels of government played a major role in the 
path negotiations took. Because the need for reductions in GHG emissions was universal accepted 
by all the governments in Canada, the focus was on which level of government was most capable 
and best suited to implementing a viable climate change policy. Additionally, because the 
constitution and Canadian jurisprudence provided a poor guide to policy-makers on where 
constitutional authority ultimately rested for climate change policy, ideological views about the 
nature of Canadian federation provided a frame of reference for both provincial and federal policy-
62
makers.10 From the ideological perspective of the provinces the responsibility for climate change 
policy rested jointly with both the provinces and the federal government, which made the federal 
decision to unilaterally move forward with the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in September 
2002 ideologically untenable to the provinces.
 Simeon also identifies three ideological emphases of the federal government concerning the 
proper functioning of the Canadian system of federalism that normally help to lessen overall 
intergovernmental conflict: unity, cooperation, and the equal status of provinces (Simeon, 2006: 
172); however, in the case of Kyoto, both the ideological emphases on cooperation and the equal 
status of provinces that one would expect from the federal government were overridden by an 
ideological concern with environmental protection. Regarding cooperative federalism, the 
government of Canada sought to move ahead unilaterally on the climate change agenda without the 
consultation satisfactory to the provinces. As for the equal status of the provinces, the federal 
government failed to provide an implementation plan that gave evidence that all provinces would 
be treated equally and could expect equal outcomes. Instead, the federal government’s ideological 
concern with environmental protection and international cooperation prevailed over the ideological 
tendencies that Simeon argues would normally help smooth interactions between Ottawa and the 
provinces.
 While on one level it is surprising that Ottawa ignored traditional methods of attaining 
intergovernmental cooperation, Simeon’s model also identifies a secondary ideological preference 
of the federal government that helps to explain this discrepancy between historical practices and 
the reality of the events that surrounded the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Simeon, reporting 
on discussions he had, writes:
[F]ederal officials are intent on maintaining the federal power, and many feel that the 
pendulum has already swung too far towards the provinces. Many federal respondents 
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10 The constitutional division of powers regarding environmental policy has been previously 
explored in Chapter 2.
echoed this view: “There definitely is one government superior to all the provinces - and 
that is the federal government,” said a French Canadian Minister. “Otherwise there is 
going to be no country” (Simeon, 2006: 173).
In this sense, Ottawa was asserting its authority for making national decisions by unilaterally 
ratifying Kyoto. Additionally, because Kyoto was an international agreement giving in to the 
provinces over climate change policy was disruptive of the federal government’s role as the single 
voice of all Canadians. 
 However, from the provincial point of view, conflict arose because federal unilateralism in 
climate change policy meant a shift in the nature of the Canadian federal system away from the 
cooperative decision-making of previous environmental policy, such as with the Canada-Wide 
Accord on Environmental Harmonization, towards federal predominance. This is reflected in the 
ideological preference identified by Simeon for “cooperative federalism,” which “reflects the view 
that Ottawa cannot dictate to the provinces; rather, it must rely on techniques of diplomacy, 
persuasion, and consultation if it is to maintain both national unity and an important voice in social 
policy” (Simeon, 2006: 172). Consequently, although the provinces acknowledged that 
constitutional authority for treaty-making lay with the federal government, the governments of 
Saskatchewan and the other provinces felt that constitutional convention required federal 
consultation with the provinces before entering into treaties with potentially extensive implications 
for them (Lautermilch Interview, 2009).11 As a result, the unilateral action of the federal 
government was met with hostility from all the provinces because it challenged both established 
practice and threatened the legal jurisdiction of the provinces over climate change policy and more 
broadly over environmental policy. Breaking these unwritten rules of federal-provincial 
consultation during the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol reflected, according to Minister 
Lautermilch, a “fundamental error” and a “blunder” in the approach of the federal government 
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11 Similarly, Christopher Kukucha, identifies numerous instances in Canadian foreign policy where 
provincial governments were meaningfully consulted before international treaties were ratified by 
the government of Canada (Kukucha, 2005: 144-145).
(Lautermilch Interview, 2009). On this level there were ideological differences between the 
politicians at the provincial level who viewed the nature of federalism as cooperative, especially in 
the case of environmental policy, and politicians at the federal level who viewed unilateralism on 
the climate change as an appropriate method for ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. 
 The above ideological factors together with economic factors, political competition, and 
differences in opinion, helps to explain the refusal of the Saskatchewan government to support the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Ottawa. In summation, the priority of the Saskatchewan 
government of ensuring economic development clashed with the ideological commitment of 
officials within the federal government to address climate change. At the same time Saskatchewan 
and the other provinces were ideologically opposed to the unilateralism demonstrated by the 
federal government in ratifying a treaty that may have had broad implications for areas under 
provincial jurisdiction without more extensive intergovernmental consultation.
5.4 Political Competition
 Political competition between the federal government and provincial governments is 
identified by Simeon as a potent source of intergovernmental conflict. For Simeon political 
competition as a source of intergovernmental conflict is important because taking into account 
political competition allows his framework to make a theoretical distinction between the interests 
of the people of a region and the political interests of the government in power. In this context 
politicians are both conscious of how a policy, such as implementing the Kyoto Protocol, will 
affect both their region and their government’s political status and strength.12 Simeon writes: “these 
types of goals and interests, which I shall call status goals, are a crucial source of conflict in the 
65
12 One historical example of placing the interests of the government over the region it governs is 
Quebec’s refusal to accept federal funding for universities. Additional federal dollars were 
certainly beneficial for the citizens of Quebec in receiving the most educational opportunities, but 
the political interests of the Quebec government led to a refusal of federal funds.
system” (Simeon, 2006: 184). There are three main types of status goals: electoral, psychological, 
and, finally, those related to policy (Simeon, 2006: 185).
 When examining the events leading up to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol it is possible to 
see several instances where both the federal and provincial governments sought to pursue electoral 
status goals. Simeon points out that reasons for electoral competition between governments that do 
not directly compete for voters is simple: “to gain credit, status, and importance, and to avoid 
discredit and blame” (2006: 185). From the point of view of Saskatchewan, the federal government 
was actively seeking the political credit for addressing climate change through the ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol without fully developing implementation plans. Indeed, former Saskatchewan 
Minister Lautermilch made exactly that point, stating that ratifying Kyoto was a “political 
announcement” and that the federal government “didn’t have a game plan for 
implementation” (Lautermilch Interview, 2009). Lautermilch further attributes the federal decision 
to the popularity of the Kyoto Protocol among Canadians, which consequently made Ottawa 
“fearful of not doing anything politically” to combat climate change (Lautermilch Interview, 2009). 
Public opinion polls of Canadians demonstrated substantial support for efforts to address climate 
change. This is evidenced by a Decima Research poll quoted by The Globe and Mail which stated 
that approximately 76 per cent of Canadians endorsed Canada ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in late 
August of 2002 (Chase, 2002: A.13).
 The view that the federal government was motivated by political concerns was further 
strengthened by the widespread belief that ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was a political 
ambition of Prime Minister Jean Chretien to secure a “legacy” before retiring as Prime Minister. 
Editorials by Saskatchewan’s leading media outlets decried the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
as an economically dangerous attempt by Chretien to cement his legacy. The Star Phoenix, for 
example, published an editorial on September 21, 2002, called “Legacy binge will hurt Grits” 
stating: 
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The push to have Canada ratify the Kyoto accord before year's end is a glaring example of 
Chretien's "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead" stance that may well earn him short-
term approval among Eurocrats perpetually looking down their noses at North Americans 
but end up seriously harming Canada's economy and the Liberals' power base when 
consumers feel the impact on their wallets (Star Phoenix, 2002: A12).
Similarly, Minister Lautermilch is quoted in the Regina Leader Post shortly after the federal 
government announced its decision to move forward with Kyoto’s ratification: 
What's the legacy? Is the legacy about creating a rift between provinces, who, 50 years 
ago, made a decision to generate electrical energy using fossil fuels against those who 
made a decision to use hydro? If that's his legacy, he's welcome to it (Mandryk, 2002: B.
7). 
The above quotation demonstrates that the government of Saskatchewan perceived that the move 
towards ratification by the federal government was meant to place a feather in the cap of the 
retiring Prime Minister. Politically, Prime Minister Chretien was in a unique position because the 
threat of electoral backlash was mitigated by his impending departure from political office. 
Extensive consultation and negotiation typical of federal-provincial relations was consequently not 
possible given the limited time left for the Prime Minister to build a lasting legacy before 
retirement.
 On the other side of the debate, Saskatchewan was also clamoring for credit for its 
contribution to climate change policy and to ensure that its actions would be recognized in any 
future national implementation plan for the Kyoto Protocol. For example, Saskatchewan’s 2002 
position paper devotes approximately six pages to outlining various Saskatchewan initiatives 
designed to reduce GHG emissions (Saskatchewan 2002: 2-7).13 Later in the position paper, 
Saskatchewan argues:
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13 Examples of such projects found in the position piece: “Saskatchewan provided $1.8 million out 
of the Innovation and Science Fund to assist in the establishment of the International Test Centre 
for Carbon Dioxide Capture at the University of Regina” and “The Conservation Cover Program 
operated by Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization will significantly increase 
carbon sinks in agricultural soils. Under this initiative, Saskatchewan has committed $26 million 
over 4 years for farmers who wish to convert marginal cropland to perennial forage 
cover” (Saskatchewan, 2002: 4)
Saskatchewan is already active in addressing climate change in ways that make sense in 
our province and reflect the opportunities we have available. Any federal plan should 
reflect our priorities and should build upon what Saskatchewan has already done 
(Saskatchewan, 2002: 14).
The political need for recognition is emphasized in Simeon’s quotation of an Ontario official: “the 
governments... are competing for political credits, and, perhaps more important for political 
prestige” (2006: 186). From a political perspective, Saskatchewan’s NDP government needed to 
ensure that its good work on the climate change file would be politically lauded and not 
overshadowed by new federal programs and a new federal climate change narrative. 
 Saskatchewan was also wary that to meet new obligations resulting from Kyoto’s 
ratification it would have to levy new taxes to pay for GHG reduction programs, taxes which the 
government of Saskatchewan would be blamed for while the federal government would take undue 
credit for the GHG reductions. An example of this point of view can be seen in Minister 
Lautermilch’s remarks found in the Regina Leader Post:
[Lautermilch] noted Ottawa is unwilling to provide financial support for federal initiatives 
and has assumed federal credit for forestry and agriculture carbon sinks, which is a direct 
attack on Saskatchewan farmers. "We are going to fight for Saskatchewan farmers as it 
relates to agricultural sinks.14 We are going to fight for support and fair treatment of our 
industries and we are going to fight to protect Saskatchewan's jurisdictions, because we 
will not give that away” (Kyle, 2002: A.1).
In this sense, Simeon’s framework underlines that the conflict arises “not just about what policies 
will be made or what taxes collected; it is about who shall carry out these policies and who shall 
collect the money to pay for them” (2006: 186). In this context, Saskatchewan’s government had a 
strong political interest in ensuring that it received full credit for its contribution, both among 
Saskatchewan citizens and among Canadians as a whole. The government of Saskatchewan feared 
that Ottawa’s move to ratify Kyoto would allow it to receive credit for leadership in climate change 
policy, but leave Saskatchewan with the unenviable task of implementing policies, and potentially 
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14 Lautermilch is referring to receiving credit for agricultural land dedicated to growing vegetation 
that works to remove CO2 and other GHGs from the atmosphere.
creating and collecting taxes on GHG emissions. A December 2001 public opinion poll for the 
Saskatchewan government demonstrated a sharp decline in the willingness of citizens to pay for 
GHG reductions with only 12 per cent of those surveyed in favor of paying $50 a year in additional 
costs to reduce GHG emissions (Fast Consulting, 2001: 16). 
 While political competition can be seen from a broader perspective as governments 
competing for public approval, it can also be demonstrated to exist at lower levels when individual 
departments or persons seek to maintain their personal status. Simeon categorizes these types of 
political competition as “psychological” status goals (2006: 188). In the context of the ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the energy and natural resource departments of the provinces believed that 
climate change policy and regulation of heavy GHG emitters was their responsibility. 
Consequently, these departments had an institutional stake in maintaining their authority on 
making climate change policy within the provinces. These bureaucracies had a tendency towards 
what then Saskatchewan Energy Department official Malcom Wilson described as “turf protection” 
and that this tendency led energy departments to “feel [climate change policy] was their 
jurisdiction” (Wilson Interview, 2009). Provincial bureaucratic turf protection led to conflict with 
the federal bureaucracy, which believed in protecting its treaty-making powers and jurisdiction 
over foreign policy. 
 Psychological status goals also played a role in the motivations of Saskatchewan’s 
politicians in opposing the political process through which Kyoto was ratified by the federal 
government. Putting aside concerns over such issues as the constitutional murkiness over 
jurisdiction or the economic impact of ratification on Saskatchewan, there remained the fact that 
provincial politicians felt aggrieved that they were not, in their judgement, properly consulted and 
heard during the decision-making process. Indeed, grievances with the consultation process even 
led Saskatchewan to boycott a proposed Joint Meeting of Environment and Energy Ministers of 
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November, 2002 (Kyle, 2002: A.1). Explaining his motivation for boycotting the 
intergovernmental meeting, Minister Lautermilch stated: 
“We prefer a partnership arrangement, an implementation plan that is fair to all Canadians, 
regions and jurisdictions. But, as far as I can see, this is a federal plan initiated by federal 
Liberal politicians, and there just hasn't been the involvement of the provinces, we think, 
that is necessary to make it work” (Kyle, 2002: A.1).
Indeed, an improved consultation process was the first demand of the 12 Point Plan agreed to by 
all provincial and territorial governments: “All Canadians must have an opportunity for full and 
informed input into the development of the plan” (JMM, 2002).15 Similarly, Wilson relates that the 
Saskatchewan’s climate change officials felt aggrieved that the federal government approached 
climate change through an opportunistic political lens compared to the more practical and balanced 
view point of their provincial counterparts (Wilson Interview, 2009). While it may be improper to 
assign too much weight to the personal status goal form of political competition (for example, turf-
protection considerations) in explaining the conflict over the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, it 
does help to explain the souring political relationship and the rhetorical exchanged between 
provincial politicians and the federal government.
 While these were not part of federal-provincial negotiations, the federal government was 
also seeking to demonstrate Canada’s role as a model international citizen for prestige reasons. The 
federal government believed that the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol would help to boost its 
image abroad. Chretien’s memoirs relate how the push to ratify was meant to galvanize the Russian 
Federation into likewise ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (Chretien, 2007: 388). Additionally, the 
federal government was widely believed to be motivated by a desire to have a superior climate 
change policy to the United States in the original 1997 Kyoto negotiations (MacDonald and 
Douglas, 1999-2000: 114) and the provincial governments believed a similar motivation was at 
play following George Bush’s announcement that the U.S. would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
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The United States’ move towards an international policy based more on unilateralism than 
multilateralism was naturally contrasted by the narrative that Prime Minister Chretien wove of 
Canadian engagement in the world, which was partially demonstrated by its commitment to the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. These international status goals help to explain why the federal 
government was intransigent towards provincial concerns over ratifying Kyoto and why it had 
shifted from its historical preference for cooperative federalism, as analyzed in the previous 
chapter, to a more confrontational and unilateral approach in the case of the Kyoto Protocol.
 In summation, as Simeon’s framework predicts, there are numerous strands of political 
competition evident in the events leading up to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. On the one 
hand, the federal government was motivated by Prime Minister Chretien’s personal desire to leave 
a lasting legacy, which overrode some of the federal government’s natural tendency towards 
cooperative federalism; the domestic popularity of climate change efforts; an institutional need to 
retain and expand the federal government’s jurisdictional reach; and, the desire to raise Canada’s 
prestige and status internationally. On the other hand, provincial governments, and Saskatchewan 
in particular, competed politically with Ottawa by seeking to retain credit for their pre-Kyoto 
climate change policies, to protect their jurisdictional control over energy and natural resource 
policy, and to demand the appropriate consultation to which they believe the provinces were 
entitled.
5.5 Differences in Perspective
 The fourth major source of conflict according to Simeon’s framework is differences in 
perspective between the priorities and interests of the federal government and those of each 
individual province.  The root of this type of conflict lies in the different role of each level of 
government in Canadian federalism and the distinct regional needs of each province. To be exact, 
the federal government is tasked with charting a national vision and implementing national policies 
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for Canada as a whole or, as Simeon writes: “the federal government tries to take a broad view. It 
tries to develop policies for the country as a whole” (2006: 190). In contrast, the provincial 
governments are only concerned with their regional interests and their narrow and concentrated 
constituency: “[the provinces] are more concerned with their own regional needs and will judge 
[federal] policies in that light” (Simeon, 2006: 190). At the same time, the priorities of both Ottawa 
and the provinces must take into account the scarcity of resources.
 In the case of climate change policy, the federal government and the provinces’ perspectives 
differed primarily in the following ways: first, the proper ranking of climate change policy 
compared to other policy priorities, such as economic growth; second, determining which level of 
government constitutionally had the jurisdictional authority for implementing climate change 
regulation; and, third, determining the specific mechanisms of the Kyoto Accord, such as the 
creation of an international carbon trading market, and the federal government’s implementation 
plans.
 With respect to the first difference in perspective, that of where climate change ought to 
stand on the list of government priorities, there is a clear separation between the agenda of the 
federal government for an international treaty with binding GHG targets, and that of the 
government of Saskatchewan, which was more concerned with sustained economic growth. 
Indeed, climate change constituted one of the primary sections of the September 30, 2002, federal 
Speech From the Throne. Demonstrating the priority of climate change to the federal government, 
the speech from the throne reads:
As part of the Kyoto Protocol, Canada agreed to obligations to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2012. Extensive consultations and preparatory work followed. The 
government is now intensifying consultations with Canadians, industry and provinces to 
develop an implementation strategy to meet Canada’s obligations over the next ten years. 
Before the end of this year, the government will bring forward a resolution to Parliament 
on the issue of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. Meeting this challenge 
must become a national project, calling upon the efforts and contributions of all 
Canadians, in all regions and sectors of the economy—producers and consumers, 
governments and citizens. (Canada, 2002: 3)
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 Saskatchewan, by contrast placed a much greater emphasis on economic development than 
on combatting the growth of GHG emissions. In comparison, Saskatchewan’s Speech From the 
Throne addresses only briefly the priority of climate change policy, stating: 
As the federal government considers ratifying the proposed Kyoto protocol, my 
government will continue to work jointly with Canada to evaluate implications of the 
protocol for Saskatchewan’s environment and economy. 
Saskatchewan people recognize the importance of climate change as an environmental and 
economic issue. Initiatives will be continued to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in our 
province. A new Office of Energy Conservation will be established (SK Hansard, 2002: 
3). 
Similarly, in the Saskatchewan Legislature, MLA Kevin Yates, a member of the governing NDP, 
referring to climate change policy said: “[the government is] concerned about the economy, about 
business in our province, because that’s our number one priority” (SK Hansard, 2002: 2877). 
Likewise, opposition MLAs presented numerous petitions from their constituents advocating 
halting the federal government’s attempt to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in favor of the province’s 
economic growth.16
 This demonstrates that politically the federal government and the government of 
Saskatchewan not only had different views on the importance of climate change policy, but they 
also had different perspectives on which level of government had constitutional responsibility for 
climate change policy. From the perspective of the provinces, responsibility for climate change was 
closely related to natural resource and energy policy, which they believed to be the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the provinces. Minister Lautermilch made this case for provincial control over 
resources as quoted in the Regina Leader Post: 
"We have jurisdiction over our resources. We will have a look at what our options are if 
they decide to move forward and ratify (Kyoto)," he said.
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16 For example, the text of one petition is as follows: “Wherefore your petitioners humbly pray that 
your Hon. Assembly may be pleased to cause the provincial government to take the necessary 
action to protect our province’s economy by working to halt the federal government’s intent to sign 
on to the Kyoto accord in its current form.” 
"Saskatchewan has the right to defend jurisdiction. Saskatchewan has the responsibility to 
defend jurisdiction. We would take that message loud and clear to the federal 
government." (Regina Leader Post, 2002: Oct 29 A.1.FRO).
Saskatchewan’s position paper on climate change makes much the same argument, demanding 
respect for provincial jurisdiction:
The plan should respect provincial jurisdiction. The federal plan should respect provincial 
jurisdiction, including provincial ownership of natural resources. The plan should provide 
fair compensation for any national use of carbon sinks developed by Saskatchewan 
farmers or for any carbon sinks accumulated by provincial forests. The plan should allow 
for a provincial role in implementation of major climate change initiatives, including 
monitoring and administration of any proposed emissions trading system (Saskatchewan, 
2002: 11)
In much the same terms, point three of the 12 Point Plan of the provincial and territorial 
governments demands of any potential federal implementation plan: “The plan must respect 
Provincial and Territorial jurisdiction” (JMM 2002). Saskatchewan and the other provincial 
governments believed that because of their jurisdiction over, most importantly, natural resources 
and other constitutional areas of provincial responsibility,17 they deserved extensive consultation 
on Kyoto’s ratification, and on any federal climate change policy. 
 The federal government took the position that its jurisdiction over international treaty-
making gave it the authority to both ratify and implement the Kyoto Protocol. Reacting to reports 
that some of the Western provinces were considering opting out of federal plans to implement 
Kyoto, Prime Minister Chretien is quoted as saying: “We wanted to make a decision earlier and we 
had a lot of discussions with the provinces and the others. But there will be a moment where a 
decision will be made. It is our federal responsibility” (Bryden, 2002: A.1.FRO). In the words of 
reporter Joan Bryden, the reaction of Stephane Dion, then federal Minister for Intergovernmental 
Affairs, was: 
Should Alberta pursue the matter in court, however, [Dion] said the federal government is 
confident it will win (Bryden, 2002: A.1.FRO).
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17 See chapter 3 for more details on provincial jurisdiction over environmental policy.
 And, before the federal-provincial meeting that led to the provinces and territories stating their 
demands to the federal government in the 12 Point Plan18, federal Environment Minister David 
Anderson said: “In fact, it's not their area of responsibility. The global atmosphere is a common 
property of all mankind and that clearly is an area for federal and international action, not 
provincial” (Bueckert, 2002). Further evidence for a clash in beliefs about jurisdiction between the 
provinces and the federal government is seen in Jean Chretien’s reaction during Question Period to 
a question from Calgary MP Joe Clark. Mr. Clark asked: 
The Prime Minister insists that the federal government will proceed before January 1 with 
Kyoto even if the provinces continue to object. Under our Constitution Canada cannot 
make Kyoto work without the provinces. For example, meeting Kyoto targets would 
require the use of credits related to carbon sinks and emissions trading.
Is the government confident that it has the constitutional authority to introduce those 
systems on its own without provincial cooperation? Has the government sought a specific 
legal opinion identifying this authority and will it table that opinion?
To which the Prime Minister replied curtly: “Mr. Speaker, we have the authority” (Canada 
Hansard, 2002b: 1904). Throughout the Kyoto ratification debate these differences in perspective 
over constitutional authority for implementing climate change policy provided an important source 
of conflict.
 The federal and provincial governments also clashed over their different perspectives on 
what the best instruments were to implement climate change policy. For the federal government it 
was clear: effective climate change policy involved the engagement of the international community 
through a binding international treaty. The provinces, however, were skeptical about the purported 
effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. Provincial governments, Saskatchewan included, had grave 
concerns over the mechanisms that would be used to reach GHG reduction targets. Saskatchewan’s 
position paper advocated this view:
Saskatchewan is concerned that the federal plan might rely too heavily on the purchase of 
international emission credits from other countries that will not reduce global greenhouse 
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18 See Appendix A.
gas emissions and will not have any direct impact on the environment. Wherever possible, 
it would be far more beneficial to invest these funds into actions that will both reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and create new opportunities and jobs for Canadians. Canada 
could invest in international development projects that encourage sustainable development  
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in other countries. (Saskatchewan, 2002: 12-13).
 Indeed, the provincial governments believed that the transfer of wealth through the 
purchasing of carbon credits from underdeveloped countries or the failed economies of the former 
Soviet Union19 would have little impact on reducing the absolute amount of GHG emitted into the 
atmosphere (Mandryk, 2002b: A.10). Instead, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, argued for “technology 
funds” that would be used to invest in developing new methods and technologies to reduce GHG 
emissions (Parsons Interview: 2009). While this idea was only in its infancy during the 2002 
ratification debate, it was supported by leading industry groups opposed to the Kyoto Protocol 
(Brethour, 2002: B.6) and was featured prominently in Alberta’s rival climate change plan 
Albertans and Climate Change: Taking Action released by the government of Alberta in October, 
2002 (Alberta, 2002). Moreover, “technology funds” represent a classic tactic of federal provincial 
relations identified by Simeon of “changing reality” by introducing a competing provincial 
initiative or vision (2006: 247).20
 Saskatchewan also questioned the continued effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol following 
the United States’ decision not to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Saskatchewan was concerned that 
implementing Kyoto would simply shift inefficient industries to the United States. This would 
result in a net loss of economic activity in Saskatchewan, but achieve no cuts to GHG emissions 
because the source of emissions would only shift from Saskatchewan to the United States 
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19 Since the the Kyoto Protocol uses 1990 as a baseline year, the GHG emissions of a number of 
former Soviet Republics are well below the targets required of them because their economies 
collapsed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Under the Kyoto Protocol these Soviet 
Republics are allowed the possibility of trading carbon credits to more developed countries.
20 Simeon cites the Quebec Pension Plan as a historical example of rival provincial initiatives.
(Saskatchewan, 2002: 13). Statements by industry leaders such as IPSCO president Phil McFail to 
the National Post, demonstrated this perspective:
"The most logical thing you would do, depending on how the economy deteriorated, is 
you operate the equipment to the point where it's not worth operating any more and then 
you build a new facility somewhere else," he said.
"As far as where to go, it would be wherever the market is best. Certainly, the U.S. has no 
problem whatsoever with this regulation of carbon and where you look for clarity, that's 
where you'd be going" (Seskus, 2002: FP.3).
From Saskatchewan’s perspective, it was illogical for the federal government to argue the 
economic merits of an international GHG reductions treaty that did not include the United States.
 Saskatchewan also feared that the climate change initiatives that it had already undertaken 
would not receive credit or renewal of funding under the federal government’s climate change 
plan.  Saskatchewan’s position paper demanded: “Saskatchewan is already active in addressing 
climate change in ways that make sense in our province and reflect the opportunities we have 
available. Any federal plan should reflect our priorities and should build upon what Saskatchewan 
has already done” (Saskatchewan, 2002: 14). From the perspective of planning climate change 
projects, Saskatchewan was concerned that its provincial initiatives would be forced in another 
direction to qualify for funds under a new federal climate change program, a direction which might 
not reflect the most efficient means to reduce GHG emissions in Saskatchewan.
 As predicted by Simeon’s framework, differences in perspective about climate change and 
the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol provided an important source of conflict between the 
provincial governments and the federal government during the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
5.6 Conclusion
 The chapter has sought to analyze Saskatchewan’s perspective on the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol through Simeon’s lenses of economic conflict, ideological conflict, political 
competition, and differences in perspective. Economic conflict, as predicted by Simeon, was the 
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most potent source of conflict between Saskatchewan and the federal government. Saskatchewan’s 
hesitancy towards supporting federal ratification of the Kyoto Protocol can largely be attributed to 
the uncertainty surrounding the federal government’s implementation plans considering the GHG 
intensive nature of Saskatchewan’s economy.
 At the same time, this chapter has shown that the other sources of conflict identified by 
Simeon played an important role in the shape events took and the intensity of opposition displayed 
by Saskatchewan and the other provinces to federal unilateralism. The ideological shift from 
cooperative federalism in environmental policy prior to Kyoto’s ratification by the federal 
government to a confrontational approach played a major role in generating provincial opposition. 
Provincial opposition was magnified by the political assurances the federal government had given, 
and then ignored, first in 1997 by ignoring the agreement reached at the JMM in Regina, and 
second by failing to adequately consult the provinces before announcing the federal intent to vote 
on ratification. Likewise, political competition played an important role in Saskatchewan’s distrust 
for the motivations of the federal government. As observed in this chapter, Saskatchewan viewed 
the federal government as politically motivated, concerned more with the best political outcome to 
raise the federal government’s international prestige and to cement the legacy of the departing 
Prime Minster rather than, from Saskatchewan’s perspective, the best policies. Finally, differences 
in perspective over priorities, jurisdiction, and specific implementation policies, help to explain a 
number of the roadblocks to compromise between the provinces and the federal government on 
Kyoto’s ratification.
 The case study of the Kyoto Protocol’s negotiation and ratification has shown that applying 
the Simeon’s four sources of conflict remains a useful tool in analyzing Canadian federalism 40 
years after its original publication. The next chapter will seek to further explore the ongoing 
usefulness of Simeon’s framework and expand on how the Kyoto case study demonstrates that 
international influences and considerations interact with each of Simeon’s sources of conflict.
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CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSION
6.1 Introduction
 Climate change policy, as with any major social and political issue in Canadian federalism, 
is multifaceted to say the least. Without a strong frame of reference one can easily become lost 
attempting to analyze the multitude of actors, issues, and influences on the intergovernmental 
process, which can lead to contradictory conclusions on only a cursory examination. This thesis 
has attempted to make use of Simeon’s theoretical framework as an analytical tool to make sense 
of both the events that occurred during Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and the 
motivations and negotiating tactics used by both levels of Canadian government.
6.2 Major Findings
 This thesis has argued that the root sources of conflict between the Saskatchewan 
government and the federal government during the ratification of Kyoto are consistent with 
Simeon’s theoretical framework on federal-provincial relations. By applying Simeon’s four sources 
of conflict in analyzing Saskatchewan’s perspective on climate change policy a more complete 
policy picture has emerged. On the one hand, it is tempting to assert the simplistic analysis that 
Saskatchewan’s opposition to the Kyoto Protocol was based solely on economic grounds and 
maximizing the financial resources of the provincial government. On the other hand, the details 
reveal that Saskatchewan’s position was also affected by the other sources of conflict identified by 
Simeon, for example, ideological concerns about the role of government in society, political and 
institutional concerns over inadequate federal consultation, and differences in perspective over 
constitutional jurisdiction and the structure of the Kyoto Protocol itself. Therefore, it is important 
to avoid tunnel vision by focusing on only one specific source of conflict when analyzing 
intergovernmental relations, and the case of Kyoto is no exception. Or, to quote Simeon: 
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The four factors which are important obviously interact with each other. For example 
status concerns contribute to ideologies which emphasize either provincial or federal 
dominance, as the case may be. Differences in focus are at least partly related to 
differences in economic need (Simeon, 2006: 196-197).
 Nonetheless, economic factors played the strongest role in determining the Saskatchewan 
government’s position on Kyoto. Saskatchewan’s position was informed by the nature and history 
of the province’s economy. Specifically, in 2002 Saskatchewan was only just emerging from a 
period of economic malaise and deep budgetary cuts, both federally and provincially, that had 
begun in the early 1990s. Consequently, the government of Saskatchewan’s recent economic 
experience had conditioned the provincial government to approach the possibility of expansive 
new obligations to meet the Kyoto Protocol with suspicion. Additionally, given that economic 
activity in Saskatchewan generates nearly three times the amount of GHGs than the Canadian 
average,21 the government of Saskatchewan was keenly aware that staking out a favourable 
national climate change plan was critical to the ongoing economic growth of the province. 
Saskatchewan wanted to ensure that the economic impact of meeting Canada’s obligations was 
equally shared across Canada instead of focusing on the industries located in Saskatchewan that are 
more GHG intensive.
  Ideological factors were also important in determining how Saskatchewan viewed the 
Kyoto Protocol compared to the federal government. Saskatchewan’s policy makers approached 
the ratification debate with pragmatism and were frustrated by the more ideological approach of 
the federal government. The federal government’s view of climate change policy as a priority 
worthy of action, even at the cost of economic development, clashed with the more hard-nosed 
economic approach of the Saskatchewan government. Further, the Saskatchewan government also 
viewed the federal government’s actions as ideologically based, given its failure to present a well-
thought out implementation plan. The federal government’s inability to look beyond the political 
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21 See Table 5.1
value of championing GHG reductions to the details of implementing a truly effective climate 
change strategy obstructed provincial attempts to reach a compromise with the federal government 
on the Kyoto Protocol. 
 Moreover, the provincial government was ideologically uneasy with the federal 
government’s unilateral actions in such an important policy area such as regulating climate change. 
This uncertainty and uneasiness was coupled with a general distrust, arising in part from the NEP, 
towards federal involvement in the provinces’ economy. Saskatchewan’s historical disputes with 
the federal government regarding jurisdiction over natural resources and the revenue generated 
from nonrenewable resource extraction reinforced skepticism of the federal government’s 
motivations in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. The general break from cooperative and collaborative 
forms of federalism in environmental policy towards unilateralism caused grave concerns within 
the Saskatchewan government.
 Simeon is also correct in asserting that political competition plays an important role in 
intergovernmental conflict. Political competition played a major role in the case of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Gaining credit for taking action on climate change was at the forefront of the 
intergovernmental dispute between Ottawa and the provinces. This case study reveals that 
Saskatchewan was concerned with receiving credit over its contribution in the fight to combat 
climate change. At the same time, Saskatchewan was critical of the federal government’s motives 
for ratifying the Kyoto Protocol given the impending departure of Prime Minister Chretien. Indeed, 
many in Saskatchewan, and nationally, viewed the federal government’s pursuit of ratification as 
meant merely to place a feather in the resigning Prime Minister’s cap and lacked any genuine 
commitment from the federal government. In this sense, the provinces feared that the federal 
government would make a bold and aspirational commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, but leave the 
provinces to muddle through the details of implementation.
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 The economic, ideological and political positions of the Saskatchewan government help to 
explain its differing perspective from the federal government on the best way to proceed with 
climate change policy. From the perspective of Saskatchewan, effective climate change policy has 
to take into account the nature of Saskatchewan’s economy and its GHG intensive nature, respect 
the constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces, and make real cuts to GHG emissions in Canada. 
The federal government was more concerned with making a commitment to the international 
community to cement Canada’s image as a model international citizen and promote the narrative of 
an environmentally conscious country. Further, the Saskatchewan government was critical of the 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, favouring instead a more made-in-Canada solution, or at least a 
solution that did not involve buying international carbon credits and offsets.
 Additionally, this thesis has argued that international considerations play an important role 
in the debate surrounding Kyoto’s ratification by the federal government. Furthermore, it has 
sought to incorporate these international considerations into each of Simeon’s four sources of 
conflict. These international considerations most obviously played a role in the federal government 
deciding to ratify an international treaty as a means of advancing public policy on climate change 
within Canada. On more subtle levels international considerations effected Prime Minister 
Chretien’s decision to pursue the Kyoto Protocol as a way of bolstering Canada’s image on the 
world stage and leaving a legacy during his twilight years in office. For the Saskatchewan 
government, international considerations mainly centred on the economic consequences of Kyoto’s 
ratification and the ability for Saskatchewan businesses to compete with jurisdictions outside the 
Kyoto framework, most critically the United States. Understanding these international 
considerations is an essential component of understanding the federal-provincial conflict that 
emerged over the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. 
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6.3 Suggested Future Research
 While the case study of Kyoto has demonstrated that Simeon’s theoretical framework is a 
useful tool in understanding federal-provincial relations, there is always a need to continue to 
refine and develop theory to better explain the reality of Canadian federalism and 
intergovernmental relations. Case studies of provinces other than Saskatchewan on the ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol may prove an important avenue of research in this regard. Similarly, 
studying each province may further illuminate the role international considerations played in the 
decision of the other provinces to oppose the ratification of Kyoto. 
 Further research into the provincial role in climate change policy may also shed light on the 
direction of Canadian federalism. For example, the Western Climate Initiative negotiated by the 
provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec as well as seven U.S. states may be 
on example of the direction Canadian provinces are looking for solving complex policy problems 
in the absence of federal leadership on climate change policy following the decision of Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative government not to follow through with Canada’s 
commitments to the Kyoto Protocol. 
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APPENDIX A: OCTOBER 28, 2002 JMM 12 POINT PLAN
Joint Meeting of Energy and Environment Ministers
Halifax, Nova Scotia - October 28, 2002
Provincial and Territorial Statement on Climate Change Policy
Halifax - October 28, 2002
The federal government has indicated that it intends to ratify the Kyoto Protocol before the end of 
this year. The federal framework on climate change, announced on October 28, does not as yet 
represent an adequate Canadian approach to reducing greenhouse gases in Canada*. Provinces and 
Territories desire a national plan.
Provinces and Territories see climate change as a serious global issue that requires immediate and 
continuing action to reduce Canada’s emissions.
Slowing, stopping and then reversing growth of green house gas emissions will require major 
changes for individual citizens and companies, in all Provinces and Territories.
Provinces and Territories have noted the federal framework, and agreed to invite the federal 
government to work collaboratively on a truly Canadian plan. Ministers reiterate the call by 
Premiers for a First Minister meeting on climate change prior to any federal decision on ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol as set out in the Premiers’ Communique at the 2002 Annual Premiers’ 
Conference.
Provinces and Territories agree that the following points are the principles for a national plan:
1. All Canadians must have an opportunity for full and informed input into the development of the 
plan.
2. The plan must ensure that no region or jurisdiction shall be asked to bear an unreasonable share 
of the burden and no industry, sector or region shall be treated unfairly. The costs and impacts 
on individuals, businesses and industries must be clear, reasonable, achievable, and 
economically sustainable. The plan must incorporate appropriate federally funded mitigation of 
the adverse impacts of climate change initiatives.
3. The plan must respect Provincial and Territorial jurisdiction.
4. The plan must include recognition of real emission reductions that have been achieved since 
1990 or will be achieved thereafter.
5. The plan must provide for bilateral or multilateral agreements between Provinces and 
Territories, and with the federal government;
6. The plan must ensure that no Province or Territory bears the financial risk of federal climate 
change commitments.
7. The plan must recognize that benefits from assets such as forest and agricultural sinks must 
accrue to the Province and Territory which owns the assets.
8. The plan must support innovation and new technology.
9. The plan must maintain the economic competitiveness of Canadian business and industry.
10.Canada must continue to demand recognition of clean energy exports.
11.The plan must include incentives for all citizens, communities, businesses and jurisdictions to 
make the shift to an economy based on renewable and other clean energy, lower emissions and 
sustainable practices across sectors.
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12.The implementation of any climate change plan must include an incentive and allocation system 
that supports lower carbon emission sources of energy such as hydroelectricity, wind power 
generation, ethanol, and renewable and other clean sources of energy.
* The NWT reserves its position on the adequacy of the federal framework.
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